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Introduction 
The major aim of the following work is to analyze the relationship between the mental 
disorder diagnosis and a person labeled by it. Since the science of semiotics is largely 
concerned with the study of meaning making processes, the topic manifests itself relevant 
for the semiotic research as it gives the possibility to approach the mental disorder label 
as a meaning creator mechanism capable to affect several aspects of a person’s cognitive 
and behavioral functioning.  
There is no shortage of disagreement when it comes to discussion around mental health 
related problems. If we were asked to make a list of the most problematic topics and 
controversial theories, discourse over mental health would be in the top of such a list. 
Unlike physical illnesses, mental diseases have always been ambiguous by their nature, 
posing a great deal of questions, including the question of their own validity.  
In present day, views on the mental illnesses range from understanding them in a same 
manner as physical illnesses to approaching mental diseases as socially constructed 
phenomena. Adherents of the former practice follow the steps of modern psychiatry and 
welcome different kinds of treatment offered for those affected by mental conditions, 
while others accuse psychiatrists in over-diagnosing individuals. More radical criticism 
suggests that mental disorder as invented, not identified. The question then arises, does 
constructed mean unreal? This subsequently leads to a number of heated discussions, in 
most cases without achieving the consensus.  
Clearly, whether ‘real’ or ‘constructed’, mental disorders regardless different 
understandings and associations they evoke, do exist and are manifested in the lives of 
individuals either afflicted by them, treating them or witnessing them. Along with the 
development of psychiatric practices, number of the identified mental disorders together 
with people diagnosed increases. Evidently, what is common for all kinds of illnesses is 
the presence of a label. All disorders require their names in order to be valid, identified 
and further defined. Analyzing the functioning of such a label in regard of a person’s 
relationship with it is a very major concern of the following work. Not to choose a 
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premature approach with an attempt to overgeneralize the topic and squeeze different 
kinds of mental illnesses into one research, the thesis focuses on the specific mental 
disorder and dwells on the effects of being labeled by it.  
 
The Study Object  
Among the kinds of mental disorders, we encounter the notion of the personality 
disorders that are defined as the fixed patterns of an individual’s perceptions and 
behaviors, deviating from norm. Unlike other mental conditions, personality disorders are 
qualified as long-standing and pervasive. The study object of the following paper, 
borderline personality disorder (BPD), is clinically known as a severe form of 
psychopathology, mainly characterized by the instability and extreme intensity of 
emotions, uncertainty of self-concept (identity disturbance) and impulsive, self-
destructive behavior. The term ‘borderline’ was first used in the late 1930s, but the 
condition as it is known today, gained its identification as a mental illness only in 1980.  
Borderline personality disorder, due to its distinguishably complicated quality 
undoubtedly produces terrains of vagueness and eminently attracts the researchers 
interested in the field. As described by the clinicians, BPD stands out from the rest of the 
personality disorders as the most researched and paradoxically enough, still the least 
understood, confusing even the experienced mental health professionals.  
In many ways, the borderline syndrome has been to psychiatry what the virus is to 
general medicine: an inexact term for a vague but pernicious illness that is frustrating to 
treat, difficult to define, and impossible for the doctor to explain adequately to his 
patient” (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 7)  
This can be partly explained by the high level of heterogeneity of the disorder, as BPD 
symptomology combines quite vast set of symptoms. Furthermore, according to present 
psychiatric knowledge, BPD shows a very high rate of comorbidity as in majority of 
cases, people diagnosed with BPD also have some co-occurring disorder. “Additionally, 
studies corroborate that about 90 percent of patients with the BPD diagnosis also share at 
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least one other major psychiatric diagnosis” (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 6).  
In fact, BPD positions itself as a highly challenging mental illness for both its sufferers 
and mental health professionals. Naturally, the more complicated a context of a condition 
covered by the single label is, more intricate accessing oneself becomes for the person, 
looking through the lenses of the label. A very strong stigma attached to the condition 
deeming those diagnosed with it as manipulative, attention-seeking, draining and even 
dangerous, definitely adds up on the perceptions that can be derived form the label alone.  
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) and “difficult patient” status are intimately linked. One 
study found that “psychiatrists mentioned the diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder up to 
four times more often than any other diagnosis when asked about the characteristics of difficult 
patients” (Koekkoek et al., 2006:797). Several more have indicated that almost all difficult 
patients have “borderline personality organization” (See Koekkoek et al., 2006, Group for 
advancement of psychiatry 1987; Fiore, 1988; Schwartz and Goldfinger, 1981). The very 
symptoms and behaviors associated with BPD are linked with how providers define the “difficult 
patient.” Kelly & May (1982) found that behaviors such as mutilation, chronic illness, rule-
breaking behavior, aggressive, uncooperative or won't accept care, or need too much care, and are 
destructive, willful, attention-seeking and manipulative have been linked with negative attitudes 
toward patients. (Sulez 2015: 82)  
The following work aims to explore the relationship of a person and the label obtained in 
the example of borderline personality disorder, taking into account all the challenge the 
diagnosis poses.  
 
Methodological Considerations 
For the sake of providing comprehensive analysis, significant attention is paid to the 
problematic discourse on the mental health problem. The question of understanding the 
word ‘constructed’ without invalidating an essence of one’s psychological condition is 
addressed. The discourse leads us to the terrain of finding the middle ground between 
radically opposed positions, putting some groundwork for the further and more specific 
examination of the research, which is the functioning of the label.  
The theoretical part of the thesis consists of the historical-descriptive and discourse 
analysis, concerning the validity of mental illness, called into question by some of the 
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critics. The analysis of the diagnostic features of the condition is based on the fifth and 
most recent edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental Disorders (DSM), 
published by American Psychiatric Association (APA). There is another system offered 
by World Health Organization (WHO), which allocates mental disorders in International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). The reason for choosing DSM over ICD is that most of 
the assessment methods, tests and researches on BPD or any other mental disorder are 
based on DSM. In fact, ICD-10 does not clearly define BPD as a fixed diagnosis, but 
refers to it as Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder that is divided into two types: 
Borderline type and Impulsive type. However, overall description of the condition mainly 
matches with DSM criteria for BPD diagnosis.  
The empirical part of the paper analyses the biographical interviews conducted with 
individuals having BPD, results of which are approached in terms of Lotmanian 
semiotics. The role of one’s self-description in the process of internalizing the mental 
disorder label is stressed, as well as the reasons of difficulties in the communication and 
the functioning of BPD label as a code in the autocommunicative process is discussed. 
Bearing the first person relationship to the diagnostic label, thus being directly connected 
to the study object, interviewed individuals are in the best position to offer the valuable 
insights regarding the various aspects of BPD manifestation.  
The participants of interviews have been selected from the online support group for 
people with borderline personality disorder. They have been informed about the purpose 
of the interviews, as well as the aspect that their names and some of the data could be 
revealed in the thesis. Interviews have been conducted in online regime, using personal 
electronic mail. The written online form has been chosen over the oral phone 
conversations, as in the former case a person has more time and space to process the 
question and reflect on it accordingly. The open-ended questions have been sent to the 
respondents one at a time, so that the process could be interactive, enabling the person to 
engage into the communication with an addressee being present, rather than answering all 
the questions received at once, which might have felt as filling a questionnaire.  
The research participants are coming from different cultures, seven of them is from the 
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United States of America, one is form Puerto Rico (the citizens of which are technically 
citizens of USA too), two from the United Kingdom and one from Estonia. Here the 
cultural specificity aspect must be mentioned. While generally speaking, the illness can 
affect anyone regardless of race and nationality, it can be said that borderline personality 
disorder is a culture-specific in a sense of being informatively available. Given that the 
‘discovery’ of it took place in English speaking society, that the original name of it is in 
English, the whole majority of the literature providing the knowledge and information on 
the topic is available in English only and the diagnostic manuals of it are also originally 
written in English (like of any other mental disorder), gives the base to say that 
knowledge of the condition is specific to the English speaking societies.  
Again, it does not mean that people from the Eastern cultures are protected from the 
occurrence of BPD symptoms. What it implies is that there may exist manifestations of 
the condition, but if it is not accompanied with the awareness and ability of recognizing 
it, it cannot be identified and defined, that is, cannot be labeled. In this sense, it can be 
said that there exists no such diagnostic condition as borderline personality disorder in 
the consciousness of the general public of eastern societies, while it may still exists there 
on its own, manifesting itself among the certain individuals. However, if these certain 
individuals do not become worried enough about their unusual state of being, leading to 
approach a mental health professional and getting the diagnosis, they may never come 
across with the notion. And even if they do get the diagnosis, they would need to get 
acquainted with their diagnosis, which again leads to the domination of English language, 
implying that they would not be able to fully comprehend the topic unless they speak 
English.  
Another specificity revealed is the gender aspect. As it is discussed in the second chapter 
BPD is considered to be an illness of women, as it is mostly diagnosed in women (The 
validity of this point is discussed in 1.3.2.). In correspondence of the general statistics, 
nine out of eleven interviewees are female. The age of the youngest participant is twenty-
two and the oldest is forty-three years old. The responses on the opening questions 
showed that the whole majority of respondents are socially functioning, either working, 
or studying. Also, most of them are married or have a romantic partner. One of the 
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respondents currently lives in a mental health unit.  
Finally, the language used by the interviewees, including slang and slightly obscene 
terminology is remained intact as it gives the ability to fully comprehend the original 
ideas of a person interviewed.  
 
Structure of the Thesis  
As mentioned earlier, the following work consists of the theoretical and empirical pieces. 
The thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter presents the discourse on 
the dilemma of mental illness validity. A historical overview of the changeable meanings 
attained to the conditions nowadays categorized as mental disorders, contributes to the 
better understanding of the conventionality of social implications. Coming next, the 
theoretical analysis of dispute regarding the mental health related problems devotes 
attention to such problematic issues as searching for the middle path between 
approaching mental illness as made-up or strictly factual, analyzing the impreciseness of 
the line between normal and pathological, approaching illness as a purely subjective 
notion and determining the mutual interaction between people and their classifications.  
The second chapter of the thesis gives the descriptive account on its study object, which 
is borderline personality disorder. Here the detailed overview of the existing knowledge 
on the condition is presented. The brief historical survey in terms of emerging and 
developing the diagnosis is followed by examination of the present diagnostic criteria for 
BPD and main features of the disorder. Finally, the discourse on the etiology of the 
illness is presented and the problem of the stigma attached to the diagnosis is brought to 
attention. The chapter serves as an important element of providing the interdisciplinary 
account, allowing the readers with different academic backgrounds to become acquainted 
with the subject under the discussion. 
The last analytical chapter of the thesis sets forth the concepts of cultural semiotics. The 
notions of self-description, communication modeling systems and autommunication are 
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introduced and discussed in the first part of the analysis. The final part of it analyses the 
interviews conducted with eleven individuals diagnosed with borderline personality 
disorder and conceptualizes the results in cultural semiotic framework discussed in the 
preceding subchapters.  
The conclusion briefly goes through the major points of discourse provided in the work. 
It sums up the outcomes and achievements of the research performed. While 
demonstrating what the study has shown, it also addresses the issues that may need 
further contribution. A relevance of the topic to the field of semiotics and the advantages 
of semiotic approach to the topic is once again accentuated.   
The major concern of this work is to provide a thorough theoretical analysis on the 
obscure essence of mental illness and the meaning-generating role of its labels. A 
practical intention of the paper is to examine the supplementary processes of getting 
labeled with a mental disorder diagnosis, interpreting the results in the light of cultural 
semiotics.  
 
Overall, the following work aims to approach the dilemma of realness and 
constructiveness of the mental illnesses from the different angle and intends to further 
investigate the actual semiotic relationship, taking place between a person and their 
diagnosis.  
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1. Mental Illness: Constructed or 
Real?  
The following chapter aims to provide a discourse on the dispute related to the topic of 
mental health, gaining a growing attention in recent years. The question whether mental 
illness should be approached in the same manner as physical illness has been a base of 
continual heated debates. With the growth of information on different mental disorders, 
the skepticism prevailing in one part of the society intensifies. Radically inclined critics 
argue that mental disorders are not real illnesses as such, but social constructs. Naturally, 
such a perspective causes resentment and gets condemned by the people fighting the 
stigma of mental health related problems, considering such an attitude as a form of 
discrimination, causing an additional trauma for the people with the psychological 
vulnerabilities.  
Certainly, someone identifying as a survivor of the severe psychological challenges is 
highly likely to find oneself invalidated being told their struggle is not real. The 
commonly-held attitude of general public, not taking the mental health issues of people 
seriously, is exemplified by offering them such advices as ‘get over it’, instead of 
providing support as it appears natural in case of experiencing a physical illness. In this 
sense, such a stance can be understood as another shape of stigma, ‘the strategy’ of which 
is to abolish the entire concept of a problem, making someone with mental illness look 
fraud attention-seeker, or a weak person in a better case. Unsurprisingly, it may further 
encourage people’s secretiveness about their mental health problems, hindering them 
from seeking help they need.  
Whilst on one side we encounter the tendency of invalidating the feelings of certain 
population of the society, on the other hand we face growing number of people obtaining 
stigmatizing labels of different mental disorders, which one may take as a sign of the 
practice of over-diagnosing. In its attempt to find the middle ground between two 
conflicting positions, this paper claims that the question of whether mental illness is real 
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or constructed is inaccurate in its essence. In other words, it argues that the 
aforementioned problem cannot be solved with the mathematical accuracy whereas 
something equals something and only something. Rather, saying that mental illnesses are 
to some degree socially constructed does not exclude that in their functioning they are 
real and saying that they are real does not exclude their constructedness. Instead of 
putting forward an unequivocal claim, mental illnesses can be deemed constructed in 
their realness and real in their constructiveness. To put this viewpoint differently, it can 
be formulated as follows. Mental illnesses in a sense of being classified, categorized and 
labeled are socially constructed. Yet, it does not imply that mental struggles certain 
individuals experience are made up. Moreover, it can be argued that mental and physical 
illnesses are much more interconnected than we may assume, considering the subjective 
value of the illness itself.  
The opening section of the following work serves as a tour guide to the earlier centuries, 
exploring how the meaning of mental illness has emerged and evolved through the 
history of mankind. In other words, it features the path of different interpretations 
phenomenon went through on its course of converting from ‘madness’ into ‘mental 
illness’ as understood in a present day. The main purpose of the section is to draw 
attention to unsteadiness of socially established meanings attached to such conditions.  
In the following part the discussion revolves around the dispute on the validity of mental 
illness, presenting the major opposing viewpoints regarding its realness. The analysis 
provided here is a modest contribution to the discussion presented, with the goal to 
introduce the middle-path solution, approaching the problem from the different angle. 
Next subchapter focuses on the differentiation between the ‘normal’ and ‘pathological’ 
that is a serious dilemma of humankind and becomes the central issue for physicians 
diagnosing individuals with psychopathologies. The account is given on the perspectives 
of comprehending abnormal behavior and mental illness, stressing the importance of 
distinguishing one from another. The thorough analysis of the topic is provided, 
supplemented by the supporting materials. The final part of the chapter concentrates on 
the interaction between the classifications and people labeled and thus classified. 
Attention here is paid to the meaning-generative nature of a mental disorder label, 
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covering the set of symptoms and carrying a specific significance within it. 
 
1.1. To the Roots of Mental Illness - from 
Antiquity to Today  
1.1.1.Madness in the Ancient World  
Different forms of mental illness have manifested itself very long before being captured 
by the psychiatric knowledge. In fact, insanity has been an inspirational theme for the 
world’s various artists and writers, leaving its trace on the different forms of art. From the 
ancient times to the present day, human being have been in touch with the various states 
of mind, deemed disordered. Seemingly, perceptions linked to these disordered states had 
the tendency to change dramatically from one epoch to another. British Historian, Roy 
Porter has considered (2002:10) madness to be as old as mankind, pointing out that 
archaeologists have found skulls with small holes, datable back to at least 5000 BC, that 
have been acknowledged as the evidence of the trepanning practice to be present in the 
prehistoric era. Trepanning was thought to free the disturbed person, as drilling the skulls 
would allow the demonic spirits to leave the body of a human.  
Precisely, in antiquity manifestation of madness was largely linked with supernatural 
powers. People behaving in a different and unusual ways qualified as such by their 
contemporaries, were destined to be stated as ones possessed by the devils. “The 
Babylonians and Mesopotamians held that certain disorders were caused by spirit 
invasion, sorcery, demonic malice, the evil eye, or the breaking of taboos; possession was 
both judgment and punishment” (Porter 2002: 12).  
Furthermore, the occurrence of madness as a fate of punishment can be found in the 
passages of the Hebrew Bible. According to the Old Testament, the first king of the 
Israelites, Saul, and Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Neo-Babylonian Empire disobeyed god 
in their actions, as a result of which both ‘went mad’. As it follows in the biblical story, 
Saul started out very well, but got into disappointing god in the end. Lastly, not obeying 
god’s direct command to destroy all the people of Amalekites and their livestock (Samuel 
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15:3) the lord estranged Saul and he got haunted by the evil spirit, driving him mad. A 
historian of psychiatry, Andrew Scull pays attention to this biblical example in his 
thorough account on the history of madness.  
That the Jews believed Saul’s madness was a curse from God is made clear in the verses 
of the book of Samuel. The precise nature of his madness is less clear, though we know 
something about its external manifestations. Some sources speak of him being ‘choked’, 
and Samuel’s account describes rapid shifts in mood, from a depressed and withdrawn 
state to rampant pathological suspiciousness, raving and episodic violence, including a 
murderous assault on his own son, Jonathan. (Scull 2015: 17-18)  
According to the bible, neither did the great king Nebuchadnezzar escape his punishment 
from god. Being immersed in his wealth and power he began forgetting that everything 
he had was given by god. The king was warned to recognize a supreme power of lord, in 
face of a horrible dream, depicting him being mad. As he did not listen to this warning, 
god realized the dream and Nebuchadnezzar was driven insane. After seven years, when 
his sanity was restored, he humbled himself before god and regained the glory he had. 
(Daniel 4:3)  
However, as Scull clarifies, in the ancient world madness was not always a sign of the 
devil’s possession committed for the purpose of punishment, but sometimes indicated on 
the opposite events. For instance, prophets who in a logical sense exhibited signs of 
madness were thought to be divine instead.  
Some prophets may well have been seen as mad (and certainly some twentieth-century 
psychiatrists were tempted to dismiss them as examples of psychopathology). Yet for 
their contemporaries, believing as they did in a jealous and all-powerful God who spoke 
routinely through human instruments and who was inclined to visit the most severe 
penalties on those who defied Him, there must always have been reasons for doubt. 
Madness they recognized, but prophets who exhibited some of the attributes of insanity 
might well instead be divinely inspired. (Scull 2015: 19)  
Following, according to the sources, the practice of associating derangement of the 
psyche with either demonic or divine forces was widely accepted by the ancient Greek 
people as well. Consequently, treating of the mentally ill person was an area of shamans 
and priests, offering sacrifices and magic incantations as the means of treatment. Scull 
notes out that Madness, usually linked to the supernatural realm, was a predominant 
theme in the creations of great Greek dramatists too.  
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The links between madness and the machinations of the gods are likewise a staple of 
Greek drama and poetry, so much so that millennia later, Sigmund Freud would call upon 
Greek myth when he named the psychological trauma he claimed indelibly marked the 
whole human race the Oedipus complex. Panic, too, is a word that derives from Greek: 
panikon, of or pertaining to Pan, a god notorious for spreading terror. (Scull 2015: 21)  
The dominated mystical views on the mental diseases were challenged by the 
contemporary Greek physicians, declaring that such illnesses as epilepsy, mania and 
melancholia had nothing to do with the supernatural forces, rather they, as any other 
illnesses had the natural origins. An important turn from a supernatural to naturalistic 
approach was illustrated in the treatise On the Sacred Disease, based on the Hippocrates 
teachings. “With the example of epilepsy in mind, Hippocratic medicine naturalized 
madness, and so brought it down from the gods” (Porter 2002: 16). Hence, what once was 
thought to be the result of demonic possession was now proposed to be the product of an 
unhealthy functioning of a human body. The shamanic spells as the means of cure were 
replaced with the different forms of a healthy life style, such as exercise and bathing. 
However, an enlightened view has not quite replaced the supernatural approach, as many 
in Ancient Greece and Rome continued to believe in the religious explanations of 
illnesses.  
 
1.1.2. Insanity in the Christian World  
According to historians, falling of the Eastern Roman Empire caused the utter literary 
loss, including the loss of Hippocratic tradition (Scull 2005:50), leading to the total 
supremacy of religious demonology over the naturalistic views. Hence, in the 
Christianized Europe the Church became an authorized source for recognizing and 
treating mentally disturbed people. Now madness was largely considered as the result of 
one’s sinful life. Exorcism became widely utilized method to cure a mad person as people 
deviating from ‘norm’, were thought to be plagued by the evil spirits, being in need of 
driving the demon out of their bodies.  
Unclean spirits were to be treated by spiritual means: amongst Catholics, the performance 
of masses, exorcism, or pilgrimage to a shrine, like that at Gheel in the Netherlands, 
where Saint Dymphna exercised singular healing powers. The insane were also cared for 
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in religious houses. Protestants like Napier preferred prayer, Bible-reading, and counsel. 
(Porter 2002: 19)  
As historical sources indicate, medieval European societies were largely immersed in 
massive poverty, starvation and malady. “And to those largely helpless and dependent 
victims of misfortune, we may add the mad – epileptic, frenzied, melancholic, 
hallucinating, demented” (Scull 2015: 70). From the beginning of thirteenth century, 
demonology leveled up to the witchcraft, explaining the widespread plague and disasters. 
During the massive and church-authorized hunting on women regarded as witches, 
burning alive of those accused, was one of the common methods of punishment.  
This legal and theological document came to be regarded by Catholics and Protestants 
alike as a textbook on witchcraft. Those accused of witchcraft should be tortured if they 
did not confess; those convicted and penitent were to be imprisoned for life; and those 
convicted and unrepentant were to be handed over to the law for execution. The manual 
specified that a person’s sudden loss of reason was symptom of demonic possession and 
that burning was the usual method of driving out the supposed demon. [...] Investigators 
initially believed that many of the people accused of being witches during the latter 
Middle Ages were mentally ill (Zilboorg &Henry, 1941). The basis for this belief was the 
confessions of the accused that investigators interpreted as delusional beliefs or 
hallucinations. (Kring, Johnson, Davison, Neale 2010: 11)  
As Porter states, the witch-hunt hysteria has endured even during the late Renaissance. 
“In England, as late as the 1630s, a physician as distinguished as Sir Thomas Browne 
might give evidence in court backing the reality of witchcraft. In other parts of Europe, 
the demonological debates rumbled on longer” (Porter 2002: 30).  
Michel Foucault begins his famous work on the attitudes towards mad in Western society 
from the end of Middle Ages. Foucault speaks about the fifteenth century’s mindset 
perceiving madness as the replacement of newly vanished leprosy and regarding a mad 
man as a sinful creature, who needed to be estranged from the rest of the society. He 
describes the cases of such ritualized exiling of the mad men out of the community, 
beating them with sticks and driving them out of the town.  
The towns drove them outside their limits; they were allowed to wander in the open 
countryside, when not entrusted to a group of merchants and pilgrims. The custom was 
especially frequent in Germany; in Nuremberg, in the first half of the fifteenth century, 
the presence of 63 madmen had been registered; 31 were driven away; in the fifty years 
that followed, there are records of 21 more obligatory departures; and these are only the 
madmen arrested by the municipal authorities. (Foucault 2006: 8)  
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Foucault further describes the great confinement of the classical age introducing new 
ways of approaching the mad, when a biological approach took the place of supernatural 
beliefs, converting a dashed into the beast. That is, a mad person became associated with 
an insensitive animal that needed to be treated accordingly. Hence, mentally disturbed 
citizens together with criminals, homeless and poor were sent to correction houses, 
awaiting a harsh disciplined treatment. Such a practice as holding a person on the chains 
was accepted as helpful since chains could inhibit a mad man from realizing his animal 
passions. Foucault speaks (2006: 40) of the General Hospital built in Paris, in 1656, 
stating that the place was more of the judicial establishment having nothing medical in it. 
Various sources indicate that contemporary madhouses were equipped with the dreadful 
dungeons were those disobeying the administrative regulations were sent. As mentioned, 
by the end of the seventeenth century, the belief that mental illness had the supernatural 
origins was greatly discounted by the opposite. However, it did not make much change, 
as demonization was simply replaced with animalization. Moreover, it can be said that 
confinement era merely dehumanized a mad men and exercised its power over them, 
using the barbaric methods of ‘treatment’.  
Sufferers were generally chained to the walls and to the beds. At Bethlehem, violent 
madwomen were chained by the ankles to the wall of a long gallery; their only garment 
was a homespun dress. At another hospital, in Bethnal Green, a woman subject to violent 
seizures was placed in a pigsty, feet and fists bound; when the crisis had passed she was 
tied to her bed, covered only by a blanket. when she was allowed to take a few steps, an 
iron bar was placed between her legs, attached by rings to her ankles and by a short chain 
to handcuffs. (Foucault 2006: 71-72)  
It must be also noted that Porter considers Foucault’s critique of the great confinement to 
be over-generalized on the example of French jurisdictions of the time, outlining that not 
the whole Europe has embraced the similar practice. “In Russia, by contrast, state-
organized receptacles for the insane hardly appeared at all before 1850, those who were 
confined being generally kept in monasteries. And across great swathes of rural Europe, 
few were psychiatrically institutionalized” (Porter 2002: 94).  
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1.1.3. From Madness to Mental Illness  
According to Foucault, in the classical period madness was seen as a consequence of 
passion, resulting in the irrational movement of unreason and state of non-being, 
exemplified in the moments of delirium and hallucinations experienced by the insane 
mind. Two main disordered states became widely recognizable in the sixteenth-
seventeenth century’s Europe – Mania and Melancholia. The Anatomy of Melancholy, 
published in 1621, described symptoms of melancholia such as sadness, despair and fear 
as occurring without any particular reason. Mania, on the other hand was marked with 
uncontrollability of excitement. It was in the end of seventeenth century, when the two 
became acknowledged as interrelated diseases, what today can be associated with the 
diagnosis known as a bipolar disorder.  
It is Willis, with his spirit of observation, the purity of his medical perception, whom we 
honor as the "discoverer" of the mania- melancholia alternation. [...] What he first 
discovered was an internal relation which engendered strange metamorphoses: "After 
melancholia, we must consider mania, with which it has so many affinities that these 
complaints often change into one another". (Foucault 2006: 131)  
Another problematic pair of diagnosis was hysteria and hypochondria. The latter denoting 
having the false belief to be ill and former causing spasms and convulsions particularly 
associated with women. Foucault explains that physicians attempted to approach hysteria 
and hypochondria as two sides of the same coin, similarly to the case of mania and 
melancholia. Despite the inability to discover particular qualities of the conditions, 
enabling further decipherment of their interrelation, both hysteria and hypochondria 
remained to be seen as mental diseases at the end of eighteenth century.  
The physicians of the classical period certainly tried to discover the qualities peculiar to 
hysteria and hypochondria. But they never reached the point of perceiving that particular 
coherence, that qualitative cohesion which gave mania and melancholia their unique 
contour. All qualities were contradictorily invoked, each annulling the others, leaving 
untouched the problem of what was the ultimate nature of these two diseases. (Foucault 
2006: 139)  
Foucault argues (2006: 176) that doctor’s relationship with the patient in confinement 
houses during those times was still very far from the cure-oriented relationship in a 
medical sense. Rather, it had the moral implications, aiming to purify the patient and 
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regulate his behavior via punishment. The use of cold-water showers and the dreadful 
devices was considered as effective therapeutic method, regulating the behavior of the 
mentally ill in the eighteenth century. Scull further describes (2015: 155-156) one of 
those machines named the Chinese temple, consisting of a movable iron cage, plunging 
down into the water with help of pulleys and ropes. A mentally ill person was locked into 
the device and forced to sink down under the water. The device was believed to distract 
the patient from his madness, as he needed to concentrate on the surviving from 
drowning.  
The gradual conversion of madness into the mental disease was a decisive movement for 
the emerging of science of psychiatry. Whereas madness has been seen as a total 
unreason, mental illness could be approached as the definable states of mind with the 
specific set of symptoms. The final shift was made at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, when confinement practice became largely condemned. Physician Philippe Pinel 
(1745-1826) is the figure largely associated with the movement demanding the removal 
of chains from the people with mental illnesses in both literal and metaphorical sense, 
introducing an alternative approach to treat them. However some authors claim that his 
reforms were not all-inclusive.  
Consistent with the egalitarianism of the new French Republic, Pinel came to believe that 
patients in his care were first and foremost human beings, and thus, these people should 
be approached with compassion and understanding and treated with dignity as. [...] Pinel 
did much good for people with mental illnesses, but he was no paragon of enlightenment 
and egalitarianism. He reserved the more humanitarian treatment for the upper classes; 
patients of the lower classes were still subjected to terror and coercion as a means of 
control, with straitjackets replacing chains. (Kring, Johnson, Davison, Neale 2010: 12)  
Along side of flourishing a new approach - moral treatment, madness became isolated 
from the criminal and ceased being brutalized in the scale of civilized world. Patients 
with mental illness now were approached as those who should be properly treated on the 
basis of human psychology and moral concerns, instead of casting out and languishing 
into the jails. Houses of confinement were replaced with mental asylums. Curing patients 
and returning them to the society as the fully functioning members was acknowledged as 
the main goal of mental hospital treatment. Yet, Foucault and his followers have largely 
criticized (Foucault 2006: 244) this reformative turn of the psychiatry, suggesting that 
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new strategy despite of abolishing punitive treatment, still implied moral control over the 
patients as its main purpose.  
Another revolutionary wave took the place in the late nineteenth century, in the face of 
creating the psychoanalysis. Developing his theories and accentuating an importance of 
unconscious mental activities, Sigmund Freud laid the base for the upcoming ideas of 
therapeutic treatments for the twentieth century.  
It was already in 1939 when the World Health Organization (WHO) added mental 
disorders to the International List of Causes of Death (ICD) (since 1949, called 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases). Thirteen years later the first version 
of diagnostic manuals created by American Psychiatric Association (APA) was 
published. “Even though American psychiatrists had played a prominent role in the WHO 
effort, the APA published its own Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) in 1952. 
(Kring, Johnson, Davison, Neale 2010: 64). Nowadays, the DSM is the major psychiatric 
source, widely used by the clinicians of the world. The most recent, fifth revision of DSM 
was published in May of 2013.  
 
1.2. Real versus Constructed  
1.2.1. Present Dilemma – Myth or Reality?  
The growth of information on the mental health brought into light new perspectives of 
approaching mental illnesses, leading to the structural and categorical differentiation of 
them. Over the past decades, much attention has been paid to the study of the nature and 
development of mental disorders. The personality traits ones being demonized, now 
appeared to find their place in the delicately elaborated diagnostic manuals. The great 
effort has been devoted to the research of the causes and effective ways of treatment of 
different mental conditions. There is a rapidly growing literature documenting the 
features of categorized illnesses and recommending the ways to cope with them. With the 
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growth of public awareness, psychotherapy has become a part of the life for the 
significant number of the twenty-first century citizens. Despite these, the topic of mental 
health still holds highly tense in its ambiguity and vagueness.  
To all appearances, psychiatry occupies the unique niche among the branches of 
medicine. Dealing with the emotional and behavioral problems of patients by means of 
fitting them into a medical model is what distinguishes psychiatrists from the rest of 
medical doctors. In this respect, psychiatry has gone under the criticism, questioning the 
validity of the field in general and accusing its representatives in doing more harm than 
good. The question whether psychiatry should be identified as an integral part of 
medicine has been the subject of much debate over the years. Some critics go as far as 
objecting the whole concept of mental illness and accordingly dismissing the essence of 
psychiatry. Perhaps Thomas Szasz can be declared as the foremost critic of psychiatry 
who devoted his career to the fight against the psychiatric practices, requiring redefining 
of mental health problem. In his best-known work The Myth of Mental Illness (first 
published in 1961) Szasz declared psychiatry as a pseudo-science, engaging in the 
treatment of something non-existent.  
Psychiatry is conventionally defined as a medical specialty concerned with the diagnosis 
and treatment of mental diseases. I submit that this definition, which is still widely 
accepted, places psychiatry in the company of alchemy and astrology and commits it to 
the category of pseudoscience. The reason for this is that there is no such thing as 
“mental illness. (Szasz 1974: 1)  
What Szasz based his core statement on, is a strictly organic concept of illness, 
recognizing the bodily abnormalities only. It is central to his argument that a mind as the 
organ of a human body does not exist and accordingly, there is no scientific way to prove 
the existence of mental illness either. Thereupon, he argued that mental illness is a pure 
metaphor, applied to the people with problematic lives and has nothing in common with 
an actual essence of disease. “Strictly speaking, disease or illness can affect only the 
body; hence, there can be no mental illness” (Szasz 1974: 267). Overall, Szasz accused 
psychiatry in assuming a role of the moral police, placing a human behavior within the 
ethical framework, disapproving and stigmatizing it by virtue of inventing ‘so-called 
mental illnesses”.  
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Not unexpectedly, his radical outlook has gone under the massive criticism, especially 
considering his status as a professor of psychiatry. Szasz’s ideas got largely dismissed 
and announced as a failure in his provocative attempt to debunk the essence of psychiatry 
by his opponents. Nevertheless, he earned an equal praise for the same work by those 
sharing his ideas. Robert E. Kendell was one of those professors of psychiatry who went 
into debate with Szasz, responding to his accusations towards psychiatry with a counter-
criticism. The main argument of Szasz, based on the body-mind distinction seems 
unsound to Kendell as he approaches both in the same concept in regards to experiencing 
illness, stressing that the fundamental characteristic feature of bodily illness – pain, is a 
psychological phenomenon. “Neither minds nor bodies suffer from diseases. Only people 
(or, in a wider context, organisms) do so, and when they do, both mind and body, psyche 
and soma, are usually involved “ (Kendell 2004: 41). Besides, he calls out Szasz on his 
selective approach while discussing the necessity of the existence detectable markers of 
bodily abnormalities for identifying something as illness.  
Like all skillful polemicists, Dr Szasz has always been careful to avoid raising issues that 
might undermine his arguments. He never discusses whether tuberculosis, small pox, 
malaria and typhoid were diseases before their underlying pathology was elucidated, and 
whether physicians were justified in striving to treat them before the causal organisms 
were identified. Nor does he ever discuss whether conditions other than mental disorders 
that are still defined by their syndromes – migraine, for example, and movement 
disorders like essential tremor, torticollis, blepharospasm, and torsion dystonia – are 
justly regarded as diseases. Presumably, this is because he recognizes like everyone else 
that the obvious suffering and disability associated with these conditions is at least prima 
facie evidence that they should be regarded as diseases, and that physicians are not only 
justified in trying to treat them but under an obligation to do so. (Kendell 2004: 33)  
Both Kendell and Szasz seem to agree that term mental illness does bear a negative 
connotation, with a historical tie of its archaic significance. However, the solutions they 
offer for this particular problem greatly differ from one another. Kendell indicates on the 
evidences, that there is a biological dysfunctions underlying for the most of mental 
disorders and vice verse and notes out that psychiatry faces the dilemma of finding a 
better term, which would not imply such a stigmatizing distinction between mental and 
physical disorders. “If we do continue to refer to “mental” and “physical” illnesses we 
should preface both terms with “so-called”, to remind both ourselves and our audience 
that these are archaic and misleading terms” (Kendell 2004: 46). As for Szasz, even 
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thought he does not deny the existence of brain abnormalities, has no intention to connect 
the brain functioning with the mental illnesses, which are diagnosed by means of 
clinically recognizable set of symptoms. That is, for Szasz brain diseases are strictly brain 
diseases and mental diseases are not diseases at all (Szasz 1976: 110).  
The discussion over the validness of mental illnesses seems to come down to the pure 
semantics. Precisely, before deciding whether mental illnesses exist or not, it seems 
logical to put the question of how do we understand illness in the first place, as the very 
perspective of approaching illness may change the whole course of debate.  
As much as Szasz makes some interesting points that may deserve careful reflecting, he 
tends to make the flat statements based on his own subjective understanding of illness, of 
course supported by the definitions of it, suitable with his outlook. Likewise, his 
opponents object the view that mental illness does not exist, considering their own 
understanding of the concept of illness. Approaching the problem in a dialectical way 
makes plain to see that reaching the conclusion is impossible unless both sides have the 
same underlying understanding of the concept they have a debate over. That is, 
syntactically both opponents speak of the same thing, but semantically they discuss 
different notion. It may remind us of a curious situation whereas two persons would 
arguing over the value of an apple, one having in mind an actual fruit and another 
thinking about the brand of techniques.  
Following, if we approach a disease as referring to a bodily lesion only, we concur that a 
mind as the tangible organ does not exist, in which scenario Szasz appears to be right 
dismissing the essence of mental illness. However, if we look at the illness as a subjective 
experience of unwell and suffering, the picture changes. Moreover, in this sense, Szasz is 
no different from the psychiatrists he criticizes for diagnosing individuals with illnesses 
based on their subjective perspective, as he himself assumes a role to set an anti-
diagnosis and decide that people do not have these illnesses.  
Not to engage in the discussions asserting the validness of mental illnesses on the 
biological and genetic level, which is the topic of a broader work with a different main 
focus, whole debate can be perhaps broken down to the simple statement. That is, if a 
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person identifies and conceptualizes the own subjective experience as an illness, 
analyzing and treating of the outcomes should be the main concern for everyone 
involved, rather than questioning the validness of illness, based on whether its signs are 
visible or perceivable.  
 
1.2.2. The Shift Between Normal and Pathological  
Discerning normal from pathological and drawing a line between these two is the central 
concern to the topic of mental health. Initially, in its essence to identify one’s cognitive-
behavioral pattern as deviating from norm, a mental illness diagnosis is built on such a 
differentiation. 
As may be seen below, the distinction between normal and abnormal is not as clear-cut as 
it may seem. In truth, due to its subjectivity the topic demonstrates great deal of 
ambiguity. Generally speaking, what is accepted as normal behavior in one society can be 
deemed strange and eccentric in another. If we break this issue down to the individual 
perceptions of normality and abnormality the picture becomes even more chaotic. In 
brief, the line between normal and abnormal is very imprecise as there is no universally 
understood and accepted definition of these notions. One may fairly ask then, how valid 
the categorization of pathological conditions can be if there exists no precise definition of 
normal behavior itself.  
Respectively, while philosophically speaking we cannot designate the essence of 
normality, being the members of certain societies we encounter with its definitions in 
different areas of life. The members of the society need to agree on the fundamental rules 
of normal behavior to function as a society and not let the chaos taking control. However, 
the topic requires more sophisticated and careful approach when it comes to 
distinguishing normal from pathological in regards of making a psychiatric diagnosis. 
American researcher psychologists have given an account of the different perspectives of 
understanding abnormality, conducive to qualify a behavior as abnormal.   
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The simplest way to define abnormal behavior is in terms of norm violation. Each society 
has a set of social norms – rules that prescribe “right” and “wrong” behavior – by which 
it members live. […] Another way to define abnormal behavior is in terms of its 
statistical rarity. Using statistical abnormality as a standard, we consider people 
abnormal when their behavior differs greatly from that of the majority (the “average”). 
[…] Less restrictive than norm violation or statistical rarity is the standard of personal 
discomfort, which is based on an individual’s self-assessment. According to this 
definition, only those who are distressed by their own thoughts or behavior are abnormal. 
[…] A fourth definition is the standard of maladaptive behavior. If a physically healthy 
person cannot hold a job, deal with family and friends, or get out of bed in the morning, 
most of us would agree that he or she is psychologically disturbed. […] Finally, we can 
define abnormality in terms of its deviation from an ideal. (Bootzin, Bower, Crocker, 
Hall 1991: 534-535) 
Authors accentuate the flaws of each perspective, stating that none of them alone is 
perfect, thus concluding that all the methods should be taken into account while 
categorizing an abnormal behavior. It can be plain to grasp the philosophically 
challenging problems presented by such viewpoints as understanding abnormality in 
terms of norm violation, statistical abnormality and deviation from an ideal. The first one 
grants authority to socially accepted standards of normality, which are changeable and 
different in every society. For another, the notion of an average person is the bottom line, 
which is also a very unsteady and variable ‘unit of measurement’ of normality, as what is 
considered average today may become abnormal tomorrow and the vice verse. An 
uncertainness of an idealistic and utopian approach presented in the last perspective can 
be already seen from its definition, as the notion of ideal is same way and perhaps even 
more subjective as the notion of normal. As for the problems presented by maladaptive 
behavior perspective, authors point out that such understanding comes also across the 
issue of subjectivity.  
The major disadvantage is that “adaptive behavior,” like normality, is subjectively 
defined and difficult to apply as a consistent standard. Germans who cooperated in the 
genocidal programs of the Nazi regime had adapted to the demands of their society; their 
behavior would be considered “adaptive”, despite being morally objectionable. (Bootzin, 
Bower, Crocker, Hall 1991: 535) 
Following, the least socially standardized way to understand abnormality, in terms of 
having a mental disorder, is to leave the right of judgment to the first person. Evidently, if 
we want to free ourselves from the socially constructed implications of what is normal 
and what is pathological, the subjective experience of unwell is what becomes of 
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importance as an underlying concept to approach the topic. However, this outlook is also 
criticized by the same authors, pointing out the problem of the diversity in regards of 
different individual’s understanding of their conditions. 
This standard is also faulty, primarily because the same behavior patterns can make one 
person miserable but bother another only a little. In fact, some people (schizophrenics, 
rapists, and murderers, for example) may be violent or dangerous and not feel any 
distress at all. Limiting the definition to personal discomfort, then, gives us no yardstick 
for evaluating any specific behavior (Bootzin, Bower, Crocker, Hall 1991: 535)  
Seemingly, the above-cited argument is written from the psychiatric standpoint and the 
clinicians are sound in their concern on too much individualization regarding the 
understanding of pathology. Outlining that the cold-blooded murderers, who do not feel 
any discomfort for their actions, cannot stand for the valid sources in defining specific 
behavior as normal or abnormal is also very much understandable. However, the point 
seems to be somewhat inaccurate. The example includes other highly stigmatizing aspect, 
such as listing “schizophrenics, rapists, and murderers” in the same context, while there is 
no evident relationship between the murderers, rapists and patients with schizophrenia. 
Optimistically, stigmatizing of the people with mental illnesses was not the very intention 
of the authors. Seemingly, their motive was to make a point regarding the imperfection of 
personal discomfort perspective alone, as any other outlook listed. However, provided 
example catches the eye of a reader, since it places a person with mental illness among 
the highly dangerous criminals.  
To leave aside the stigmatizing aspects and follow the logic of the content itself, it must 
be mentioned, that the distinction should be made between mental illness, abnormal 
behavior and criminal behavior. Logically speaking, while some of the rapists and 
murderers may actually be diagnosed with some kind of mental illness including 
schizophrenia, it does not by any means mean that all of them are. Likewise, while some 
people diagnosed with schizophrenia may be violent and dangerous, it does not mean that 
so are all of them. On the other hand, the murderers and rapists listed next to 
“schizophrenics”, are violent and dangerous being murderers and rapists in itself. For 
recognizing and treating the latter there exists a criminal code and DSM should not be 
concerned with it and perhaps neither should bring it as an example while discussing 
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abnormality in terms of mental disorders.  
Following, as we differentiated mental illness and criminal behavior, the argument of 
murderers and rapists not feeling discomfort for their actions can be disregarded in 
regards of mental health. The next and more challenging distinction to be made takes 
place between the mental illness and abnormal behavior. For this sake, first we can have 
a look at the modern diagnostic ways of distinguishing one from another. Typically, the 
usual case of diagnosing a physical illness consists of the certain stages. A doctor must 
first examine the problem, which involves asking questions to the patient and providing 
medical inspection of the problematic body area. Depending on the obscurity of the 
situation different analysis and surveys can be conducted to set the correct diagnosis and 
offer the right treatment afterwards.  
Likewise, the patients with mental illnesses usually report their symptoms to the 
psychiatrist, who using the variety of assessment tools and evaluating the degree of 
functional impairment come up with the particular diagnosis. However, unlike physical 
illnesses, the process of diagnosing individual with a mental disorder can be considered 
as more of the subjective operation, given that the presence of mental illness is not 
usually detected by the laboratory tests. In their way of making a diagnosis, psychiatrists 
use a variety of assessment measures, such as clinical interviews, personality tests, 
behavioral and cognitive assessment tests, assessment of stress and intelligence tests. 
“The data from the various techniques complement each other and provide a more 
complete picture of the person. In short, there is no one best assessment measure. Rather, 
using multiple techniques and multiple sources of information will provide the best 
assessment” (Kring, Johnson, Davison, Neale 2010: 74). Besides the psychological 
assessment methods, clinicians also turn to neurobiological assessment modes, such as 
brain imaging, neurotransmitter assessment, neuropsychological assessment and 
psychophysiological assessment. These methods help mental health professionals to have 
a close look at the structure and functioning of the brain linked to the behavioral or 
cognitive problems experienced by the patient, as well as enable them to observe the 
bodily changes such as tension in the muscles and increased heart rates linked to the 
psychological events. Finally, to set the precise diagnosis, psychiatrists use diagnostic 
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manuals providing the classification and definitions of mental disorders, making it 
possible to determine whether the condition of a person fits to particular diagnostic 
criteria.  
Seemingly, from the standpoint of mental health professionals, the specific behavioral 
and cognitive patterns identifiable in certain patients are already qualified as abnormal, 
being categorized in agreed-on diagnostic manuals of mental disorders. However, 
clinicians clarify that a presence of the corresponding symptoms is not enough for 
making a mental disorder diagnosis, but they should be causing a severe personal distress 
or dysfunction whether in interpersonal relationships or academic and job-related areas of 
life. “The DSM specifies that symptoms alone are not enough to qualify for diagnosis. 
Rather, a person must experience either impairment or distress to meet criteria for 
diagnosis” (Kring, Johnson, Davison, Neale 2010: 72). This statement logically leads us 
to the conclusion that what is qualified as illness is not behavior deemed abnormal and 
disordered, but the distress caused by them.  
On these grounds, it can be stated that the behavior and way of thinking, feeling or 
relating itself is not an illness regardless how deviating from the commonly accepted 
norm it is, but the experience of functional disability and emotional anguish is what can 
be qualified as such. Given this orientation, the pain derived whether from emotional or 
physical condition can be comprehended as illness, as long as we understand illness as 
the subjective experience of suffering. This again bring us back to the point mentioned in 
the previous subchapter, that it is a human being as a whole who suffers while 
experiencing illness, neither the body, nor the mind separately. Following this way of 
thinking, the core argument of Szasz’s radical statement that a mental illness does not 
exist, as there is no such organ as mind, can be undermined. One cannot sound profound 
stating that something is X or is not X, unless X is entirely and universally definite, 
leaving no room for alternative reasonable approaches.   
Furthermore, speaking of the illness as a subjective experience of suffering, several 
questions may arise here. For instance, one may ask what happens if a person has a false 
belief of being ill, such as the case of hypochondria, or opposite – if the person does not 
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believe he or she has illness, while medically speaking they are diseased. Since we are 
speaking from the position of the individual experience, the state of mind called 
hypochondria can be understood as illness. In fact, such a condition makes a person 
worried about their health, which they believe is in danger. Following, regardless the fact 
that biologically speaking, there may not be any presence of illness, if a person does 
suffer and experiences distress from own beliefs, this in itself fits into category of illness 
that is understood as experience of suffering. For empowering this argument, an example 
of the dead person can be brought. From the purely organic point of view the dead body 
is experiencing progressive illness, as its organs get rotten. Certainly, no one thinks of the 
dead body as diseased, simply because it is dead. What is missing is a perception of the 
person, the subjective experience of suffering from the own body getting rotten. On these 
grounds, speaking from individual point of view it can be concluded that without the 
subjective experience of illness, there is no illness and if there is the subjective 
experience of illness, it can be comprehended as such.    
French philosopher and physician Georges Canguilhem has given a valuable account on 
the topic. In his work Normal and Pathological, Canguilhem opposes the mechanistic 
views on the human medicine, reducing it to the mere organism, not taking into account 
any other meanings of human life, but strictly biological. He brings to our attention the 
importance of expanding the horizon in terms of distinguishing normal and pathological 
conditions.  
In order to evaluate the normal and the pathological, human life must not be limited to 
vegetative life […] Man, even physical man, is not limited to his organism […] Thus, in 
order to discern what is normal or pathological for the body itself, one must look beyond 
the body. (Canguilhem 1991: 200-201) 
Indeed, a deeper understanding of the subject requires taking into account the complex 
interrelation of a body and a mind all coming down to a person’s perceptions and 
experiences of oneself, rather than limiting the problem to the bodily organs.  Interesting 
aspect to mention here is that, while posing the question of the individuality, Canguilhem 
does not refer to mental illnesses specifically, but to all kinds of diseases that are concern 
of physiology. On the ground that norm cannot be scientifically defined, he suggests 
(Canguilhem 1991: 203) that neither disease can be so defined, rather it can be 
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understood as another kind of norm. On the same logic, he argues that there is no purely 
scientific and purely objective understanding of pathology and it can only have a clinical 
value. However, he explains that in their position of fighting for life and health, a 
physician can qualify the condition as pathological.  
It is life itself, through its differentiation between its propulsive and repulsive behavior, 
which introduces the categories of health and disease into human consciousness. These 
categories are biologically technical and subjective, not biologically scientific and 
objective. Living beings prefer health to disease. The physician has sided explicitly with 
the living being, he is in the service of life and it is life’s dynamic polarity which he 
expresses when he speaks of the normal and the pathological.  [...] the distinction 
between physiology and pathology has and can only have a clinical significance. This is 
the reason why, contrary to all present medical custom, we suggest that it is medically 
incorrect to speak of diseased organs, diseased tissues, diseased cells. (Canguilhem 1991: 
222-223) 
Canguilhem further concludes that illness is a subjective experience of a living being as a 
whole, not the specific condition of body parts, which is very much in agreement of what 
has been argued above.  
We do not mean that a cell cannot be sick if by cell we mean an entire living thing, as for 
example a protist [unicellular organism], but we do mean that the living being’s disease 
does not lodge in parts of the organism. […]We suggest that it is the whole that it can be 
called sick or not.  (Canguilhem 1991: 223-224)  
 
1.2.3. Interaction with the Label  
Dealing with the ‘constructed’ and ‘real’ distinction, it becomes of importance to 
distinguish between the illnesses as identified or as the fellow critics of psychiatry would 
say ‘invented’ and our ideas about them. For example, the concept of being a woman is 
definitely socially constructed with the various associations attached to it. However being 
a woman is also a natural condition for those who were born as female. The general ideas 
regarding how should a woman behave or what distinguishes her as a social being from 
another kind of social being - a male, are also purely subjective and oftentimes 
discriminating beliefs build up by the society, differing from culture to culture. 
Likewise, a person identifying oneself having a mental disorder acknowledges the 
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realness of their illness considering how the specific symptoms manifest themselves. The 
illness in a sense of being categorized and labeled by the psychiatrists is constructed. The 
ways of how the illness is perceived is certainly socially constructed as well. However, 
the distress connected to this illness experienced by the person remains real. For instance, 
a person having no name for her lung cancer would feel exact same horrible pain as one 
being aware of her illness. Similarly, not having a name and place in the diagnostic 
manuals would not change one’s painful feelings going through the mental struggle. 
However, being aware of having a lung cancer may give a birth to additional feelings 
about oneself. Likewise, since having a place in the diagnostic manuals provides the label 
for the group of people fitting into the category, it may provoke further conceptual 
changes in the mind of a person.  
Following, the question of whether creating a name for something implies creating its 
context as well may arise here. Apparently, to name the illness, first there should be a set 
of symptoms manifesting itself in the practice. On the other hand, the very moment of 
giving the name to these symptoms can be understood as a moment of creating additional 
context for the future. That is, the meanings attached to the condition, officially coming 
along the label.  
Dealing with the real-constructed dilemma of mental illness, in his successful attempt to 
take the middle-ground Ian Hacking speaks about the importance of approaching the 
topic more comprehensively, rather than stating that X is real or X is constructed.  
‘Social construct’’ and ‘‘real’’ do seem terribly at odds with each other. Part of the 
tension between the ‘‘real’’ and the ‘‘constructed’’ results from interaction between the 
two, between, say, child abuse, which is real enough, and the idea of child abuse, which 
is ‘‘constructed.’’ But that is not all. We can also confuse more complex types of 
interactions, which make some people think of antique dualisms between mind and body. 
These come out most clearly when we turn to the very habitus of mind and body, 
psychopathology. Most present-day research scientists take schizophrenia to be at bottom 
a biochemical or neurological or genetic disorder (perhaps all three). A minority of critics 
think that in important ways the disease has been socially constructed. I do not want to 
take sides, but to create a space in which both ideas can be developed without too much 
immediate confrontation—and without much social- construction talk either. (Hacking 
1999: 101)  
Hacking further introduces the notion of interactive kind of classifications and 
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differentiates them from indifferent kinds. According to him, interactive kinds are the 
categories capable to establish the mutual interaction with people classified. That is, on 
one hand, classified kinds may influence those who fall into the category and herewith 
being the subject of scrutiny, are going under the continual developing and modification 
themselves.  
"Interactive’’ is a new concept that applies not to people but to classifications, to kinds, to 
the kinds that can influence what is classified. And because kinds can interact with what 
is classified, the classification itself may be modified or replaced. [...] Kinds that are the 
subject of intense scientific scrutiny are of special interest. There is a constant drive in the 
social and psychological sciences to emulate the natural sciences, and to produce true 
natural kinds of people. (Hacking 1999: 103-104)  
As for the indifferent kinds, in contrast of interactive kinds, being placed in this class 
does not make any difference for those classified. What Hacking indicates here on, is that 
a gemstone is indifferent towards out classification of it as a gemstone, while someone 
aware of own label is not. That is, acknowledging the own place in the classified kinds 
implies an interaction with it, including rethinking oneself. Clearly, types of 
classifications can be applied to mental disorders. More precisely, mental disorders can 
be approached thought the prism of either interactive or indifferent kinds, depending on 
the subjective perspective of understanding them.  
The clinician who takes a psychological approach may seem to regard an illness as 
interactive; one who takes a biological (e.g. chemical) approach does seem to regard it as 
indifferent. If you subscribe to the predisposing/occasioning model of a mental illness, 
the predisposing cause may be biological, indifferent, while the occasioning cause may 
be social, interactive. (Hacking 1999: 119)  
The important implication of Hacking’s account is that it offers the prospect of 
approaching mental disorders in a more inclusive way. Instead of taking sides determined 
by subjective perspective and making radical statements, it makes possible to take into 
account different aspect of the subject matter. Applying the interactive kinds of 
classification to the essence of mental disorders does not abolish its place among the 
indifferent kinds of illnesses. A person aware of their disorder is likely to get influenced 
by the interaction with their label in a number of ways. However, one cannot be sound in 
stating that not knowing their diagnosis the same person would not be suffering.  
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Furthermore, Juri Lotman in his article Culture As a Subject and an Object Itself uses the 
term monad, standing for a meaning-generative unit that exists within the semiotic space. 
Lotman notes (1997: 9) that such monads are definite, self-sufficient and bear not 
material, but semiotic-informational value, providing both ‘input’ and ‘output’ between 
the unit and its outside semiotic space. It seems possible to draw some parallels between 
the monads discussed by Lotman and the labels of mental disorders. Indeed, such labels 
are meaning-generative by their nature and bear semiotic-informational value. Moreover, 
the process of producing ‘input’ and ‘output’ seems to be the focus of Hacking’s analysis 
while speaking of mutual interaction between people and their classifications. Lotman 
further elaborates on the topic and explains the purely semiotic nature of monads, from 
where some insights can be drawn regarding the capacity of labels to produce new 
meanings and store this information into memory.  
 
I have already mentioned that the monad is a generator of new messages, i.e. messages 
not constructed by automatically operating algorythms. In other works I have already 
pointed out its ability to store the information received, i.e. memory. I should also note 
that informational exchange and blending of texts takes unceasingly place within the 
semiosphere. This is granted by the structural isomorphism of monads, their integration 
into metalanguage communities, those communities where some kind of unified level of 
semiosis is being established. The presence of all these qualities permits us to define the 
semiotic monad as an intellectual unit, a bearer of the mind. (Lotman 1997: 12) 
 
Finally, Lotman himself “with certain caution” links monads to the concept of 
personality.  
 
[…]a parallel could be established between the semiotic monads and the concept of 
personality, since behavioral autonomy is to some extent also characteristic to semiotic 
monads. […] A monad as a part of a unity is governed by strict laws of determination, 
whereas as a whole, as a “personality”, it has the possibility to choose and a certain 
reserve of freedom, autonomy from the whole, and its own semiotic context. (Lotman 
1997: 13-14) 
 
In this context, the relationship of the person and their label can be somewhat crystallized 
by noting that, a label as a definite meaning-generating mechanism, in case of becoming 
the dominant part of a personality, turns a indeterminacy into the object of limitations.  
For instance, the label of the BPD diagnosis may serve as a generator of new meanings 
attached to self, considering the meanings attained by the label itself. I n terms of being 
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classified in the interactive kinds discussed by Hacking, a person with BPD may get 
influenced by the significance of the classification, covering the group of individuals with 
a shared diagnosis. In this process, a personality “that has the possibility to choose” may 
become somewhat reduced to the way it is classified, that is the definite label may attain 
the control over the infinity of a personality. However, the further analysis shall show 
that the process of forming such a synthesis is more complicated taking into account a 
person’s primary self-description. 			
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2. Borderline Personality Disorder As 
it is Known  
The following chapter provides a descriptive analysis of borderline personality disorder, 
based on the existing psychiatric and scholarly knowledge of it. The chapter aims to shed 
the light on the major aspects linked to the diagnosis. The analysis is based on the criteria 
presented by the most recent edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental 
Disorders of American Psychiatric Association.  
Borderline personality disorder is known as a severe form of psychopathology, mostly 
occurring by early adulthood. The disorder is essentially characterized by extreme 
intensity of emotions, impulsive and self-destructive behavior and identity disturbance. 
The condition poses a great deal of questions for the researchers. Even the name of the 
diagnosis is filled with uncertainty. The term does not really clarify what exactly does it 
signify, rather causes pure confusion. Hearing the name of the disorder leads to the valid 
question – ‘borderline between what and what?’ The possible answers can range from 
borderline between sanity and insanity to borderline between mania and depression and 
so forth. Logically, an imprecise term creates a large room for interpretations. However, 
as we shall see, the name of the disorder is not the only confusing element of the 
condition. Heterogeneity of symptoms linked with BPD and comorbid nature of the 
disorder make the condition fairly complex and difficult to spot and treat for the mental 
health professionals. 
The first part of the chapter takes a close look at the history of BPD and its present 
diagnostic criteria. The following section overviews the essential features and major 
symptoms linked with borderline personality disorder. The last two sections focus on the 
etiology of the condition and the causes of the stigma attached to it.  
 
	 35	
2.1. BPD from 30s to the Present Day  
2.1.1. Historical Considerations  
Considering the growing number of people getting the diagnosis of BPD, one may 
assume the condition is a present day illness. However, a large part of the clinicians 
believe that it is a professional awareness about BPD what is growing, rather than 
number of patients. In this respect, the label itself can be called new, but not the 
condition.  
Most psychiatrists believe that the borderline syndrome has been around for quite some 
time; that its increasing prominence results not so much from its spreading (like an 
infectious disease or a chronic debilitating condition) in the minds of patients but from 
the awareness of clinicians. Indeed, many psychiatrists believe that some of Sigmund 
Freud’s most interesting cases of “neurosis” at the turn of the century would today be 
clearly diagnosed as borderline. (Kreisman, Straus 2010:19)  
The psychoanalyst Adolf Stern was the first who described the symptoms included in the 
present diagnostic criteria for BPD. Furthermore, it was Stern who coined the term 
‘borderline’, in 1938. He so named the condition of patients who were believed to lie on 
the border between neurosis and psychosis. Patients labeled by Stern, did not seem to fit 
well within the diagnostic classification system of that time. Exhibiting mixture of 
symptoms of both neurosis and psychosis, they seemed to be more ill than neurotics but 
not exactly psychotic. They exhibited difficulties with perceiving reality and were 
standing out from the rest of patients as hypersensitive and very difficult to treat, creating 
trouble for the clinicians.  
Psychopathology at that times was conceptualized as occurring on a continuum from 
“normal” to “neurotic” to “psychotic.” Stern labeled his group of outpatients as suffering 
from a “borderline group of neuroses.” For many years thereafter, the term was used 
colloquially among psychoanalysts to describe patients who, although they had severe 
problems in functioning, did not fit into other diagnostic categories and were difficult to 
treat with conventional analytic methods. (Linehan 1993: 5)  
As the number of patients fitting into new unfitting category was growing, the condition 
attracted the major attention of the contemporary psychoanalysts. Several scholars have 
tried to contribute in the research of the new phenomenon during the 50s.  
	 36	
Knight (1954) presented a definitive statement of the term borderline. [...] Wolberg 
(1952) distinguishes the borderline from the psychotic even though the former may have 
temporary psychotic-like episodes. [...] Schmidberg (1959) describes the borderline as a 
syndrome blending normality, neuroses, psychoses and psychopathy in a relatively stable 
life-long period. (Grinker, Webble, Drye 1968: 11-12)  
The very first research on the patients qualified as ‘borderlines’, was conducted in 1968, 
by Roy Grinker, Beatrice Werble and Robert Drye. The term they used referring to the 
condition was Borderline Syndrome. Introduction of their book Borderline Syndrome. A 
Behavioral Study of Ego-Functioning, gives a very clear picture of the obscurity, the 
condition was immersed in at that time.  
The borderline diagnosis has not yet appeared in the official American or International 
Classification of Psychiatric Disorders, or in Stengel’s (1959) extensive survey of 
existing classifications prepared for the World Health Organization (W.H.O.). It did not 
appear in the design of the fact-finding program of the American Psychoanalysts 
Association. There are no statistics on prevalence, the term has no legal meaning and the 
label does not evoke a stereotype for most psychiatrists. There has been no published 
systematic study of these patients, and the term is now only part of the jargon of 
psychiatric practice. (Grinker, Werble, Drye, 1968: 3-4)  
The new notion ‘borderline personality organization’, was introduced by Otto Kernberg, 
offering new clinician insights. He divided mental disorders into three distinct types: 
psychotic, neurotic and borderline personality organizations.  
The term “borderline” should be reserved for those patients presenting a chronic 
characterological organization which is neither typically neurotic nor typically psychotic, 
and which is characterized (i) by typical symptomatic constellations; (ii) by a typical 
constellation of defensive operations of the ego; (iii) by a typical pathology of 
internalized object relationships; and (iv) by characteristic genetic-dynamic features. 
(Kernberg, 1975: 5)  
Following, major contribution in defining the disorder was made by John Gunderson and 
Margaret Singer, in 1975, when they published an article in The American Journal of 
Psychiatry (Vol. 132, issue 1, pp.1-10) synthesizing relevant literature review and 
defining six essential features of the disorder, including emotional intensity, impulsivity, 
problems with interpersonal relationships and short living psychotic episodes. Later, 
Gunderson proposed and published research instrument for diagnosing the condition 
accurately.  
Finally, in 1980 the condition got officially recognized as a valid diagnostic entity by the 
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American Psychiatric Association and entered DSM III. Research interest in a newly 
emerged mental illness began to grow rapidly. The number of the researchers have 
contributed to explore the nature of BPD in 1980s.  
Gunderson (1984) has summarized four relatively distinct clinical phenomena 
responsible for the continued psychoanalytic interest over the years in the borderline 
personality. […] Taken together, these four observations suggested the existence of a 
group of individuals who did not do well in traditional forms of treatment, despite 
positive prognostic indicators. […] In contrast to the single continuum proposed in 
psychoanalytic thought, biologically oriented theories have conceptualized BPD along 
several continua. From this viewpoint, the disorder represents a set of clinical syndromes, 
each with its own etiology, course, and outcome. Stone (1980, 1981) has reviewed this 
literature extensively and concludes that the disorder is related to several of the major 
Axis I disorders in terms of clinical characteristics, family history, treatment response, 
and biological markers. For example, he suggests three borderline subtypes: one related 
to schizophrenia, one related to affective disorder, and a third related to organic brain 
disorders. […] A third approach to understanding borderline phenomena has been labeled 
the “eclectic-descriptive” approach by Chatham (1985). A fourth approach to 
understanding borderline phenomena, based on a biosocial learning theory, has been 
proposed by Millon (1981, 1987a.). (Linehan 1993: 7-10) 
However, as we shall see the clinicians still struggle to identify an exact nature and 
causes of the disorder and people labeled by the BPD diagnosis still experience the 
stigma coming not only from the general public, but in many cases from the mental 
health professionals as well.  
 
2.1.2. Diagnostic Manuals of BPD  
Borderline personality disorder is one out of the ten personality disorders listed in the 
fifth edition of DSM of American Psychiatric Association. The DSM defines personality 
disorders as “an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly 
from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset 
in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or 
impairment” (APA 2013: 645). In this sense, personality disorders differ form other kind 
of mental illnesses, such as mood disorders, which are considered as conditional and 
usually responsive to the medication. BPD is placed in the cluster B (group of dramatic, 
emotional and erratic personality disorders) together with antisocial, histrionic and 
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narcissistic personality disorders. The symptomology of BPD is very wide in range. 
Among the features linked to the disorder can be found extreme and brief mood swings, 
black and white (polarized) thinking, splitting (idealization and devaluation cycles), 
chronic feeling of emptiness, no clear sense of self-image, chaotic interpersonal 
relationships, paranoid ideation, uncontrollable rage, inability to control impulses, 
substance abuse, self-harm and suicidal behavior.  
The diagnostic criteria of borderline personality disorder presented in the most recent 
DSM-V consist of nine categorical symptoms. (APA 2013: 663) A person gets BPD 
diagnosis if she meets five or more out of nine symptoms listed below.  
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. (Note: Do not include suicidal 
or self-mutilating behavior covered in criterion 5.)  
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by 
alternating between extremes of idealization and devaluation 
3. Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self 
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., spending, sex, 
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). (Note. Do not inculde suicidal or self- 
mutilating behavior covered in criterion5.)  
5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior 
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense episodic 
dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a 
few days) 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent displays of 
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights) 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms  
Despite its prestigious position to be considered as a psychiatric bible, DSM criteria still 
is a topic of discussion among those concerned with mental health problems. There is an 
ongoing debate among the researchers discussing whether the current criteria are 
effective in identifying the disorder. Some researchers argue that replacing the structural 
and categorical manuals with more dimensional approach to diagnosis would be 
beneficial to better treat mental health patients.  
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Some researchers have suggested adjusting the DSM to a dimensional approach to 
diagnosis. Such a model would attempt to determine what could be called “degrees of 
borderline,” since clearly some borderlines function at a higher level than others. These 
authors suggest that, rather than concluding that an individual is – or is not – borderline, 
the disorder should be recognized along a spectrum. (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 9) 
One may argue that structured paradigm presented in DSM does not require changes and 
measurement whether a patient is more highly functioning or low functioning should not 
necessarily be included in the criteria, but can be addressed in the treatment process. 
Certainly, structural categorization of symptoms can be an efficient way for mental health 
professionals to evaluate whether someone is qualified as borderline or not. Yet, some 
questions may arise regarding the present method of diagnosing BPD.  
As it was mentioned above, for the BPD diagnosis it is required five or more symptoms 
out of nine to be present. What creates confusion here is the question of what happens if 
the person exhibits not the minimally required five but only four traits out of nine. For 
instance, one may have serious suicidal tendencies, may experience impulsivity in all 
areas listed in the criteria, may struggle with difficulty to control intense anger and have 
massive problems with interpersonal relationships due to her tendency of idealizing and 
devaluating others. Apparently, person would manifest four of the essential BPD traits 
recognized as such, making their life difficult enough to reach out for help. However, as 
DSM suggests, they would not be diagnosed with BPD due to the fact that one more 
criteria would be missing from the whole picture.  
One more important aspect to reflect on here is that obviously, everyone from time to 
time may experience some of the traits listed in the BPD and perhaps any other 
personality disorder criteria. One may act impulsively and regret her actions afterwards, 
explode with anger during the stressful period, feel empty and bored, experience 
confusion about their true identity and so forth. Certainly, it does not mean one 
automatically is qualified as someone having borderline personality disorder. Apparently, 
all the features listed, regardless how extreme some of them may seem, are part of human 
behavior. We can hardly find a person presenting only healthy qualities, as the human 
nature implies in itself having the mix of both healthy and unhealthy traits. As mental 
health professionals clarify and as it was discussed in the previous chapter, the question 
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of having a personality disorder is put on the table when the disordered traits reach a level 
of frequency and rigidity, causing a functional impairment. To put it differently, 
unhealthy traits cease being just unhealthy traits and become personality disorder 
elements when they form fixed pattern of behavior, thinking and relating, widely 
affecting one’s interpersonal and intrapersonal functioning.  
 
2.2. ‘Stable Unstable, Predictably Unpredictable’ -
Essential Features of BPD  
2.2.1. Emotional Intensity and Instability  
Marsha M. Linehan, Professor of psychology and adjunct professor of psychiatry and 
behavioral sciences at the University of Washington in Seattle, has significantly 
contributed in enrichment of borderline personality disorder theoretical scholarship. 
Moreover, she is an author of the Dialectical-Behavioral Therapy (DBT), which 
nowadays is known as one of the first choices of treatment for those with BPD. In her 
interview with Time Magazine (2009) Linehan describes patients with BPD as 
individuals who lack emotional skins. “Borderline individuals are the psychological 
equivalent of third-degree burn patients. They simply have, so to speak, no emotional 
skin. Even the slightest touch or movement can create immense suffering. “  
As determined, emotional intensity and high level of sensitivity is one of the core features 
of borderline personality disorder. Following, having BPD implies having a trouble with 
regulating emotions and as described by clinicians and patients themselves, experiencing 
the highest highs and the lowest lows. Emotional reactions to the events of those with 
BPD are qualified as out of proportion of the events they response at. That is, whereas the 
healthy person would have an average reaction on a particular trigger, emotional response 
of someone with BPD would be much more extreme. Meaning, whereas a healthy person 
would feel sad, an individual with borderline personality disorder would feel devastated.  
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Besides emotional intensity, people with BPD are identified as emotionally unstable. In 
fact, instability is an essential hallmark of the condition. ‘Stably unstable and predictably 
unpredictable’ as referred by clinicians, patients with borderline personality disorder tend 
to experience extremely rapid and unpredictable mood changes characterized as very 
intense and brief. Following, someone with BPD may go through the mood changes cycle 
multiple times in a course of the single day, rapidly shifting from the heights of happiness 
to depths of despair, from severe depression to true euphoria. Researches link this 
symptom with the tendency of misdiagnosing people with BPD with bipolar disorder, the 
core feature of which is such a radical fluctuation of moods. However, clinicians explain 
that unlike bipolar disorder where these mood shifts last for days, weeks or months, 
people with borderline personality disorder cycle much more quickly. Besides, as 
explained, mood cycles in bipolar patients are caused by neurological chemical 
imbalance, while BPD mood shifts are known to be responsive to the outside stimuli and 
triggers.  
Following, people diagnosed with borderline personality disorder are deemed difficult to 
establish and maintain close and healthy relationships with. As defined, individuals with 
BPD tend to think in two extremes. That is, they perceive everything as either black or 
white, with no grey area in between. Dichotomous thinking applies to their perception of 
self as well as approaching others, manifested by the constant alternation between two 
extremes of idealization and devaluation. The term used by the clinicians to depict this 
feature is ‘Splitting’. The term suggest that patients with BPD may perceive someone 
close to them as entirely good and wonderful one moment and switch to seeing them as 
utterly bad and awful the next.  
Technically defined, splitting is the rigid separation of positive and negative thoughts and 
feelings about oneself and others; that is, the inability to synthesize these feelings. Most 
individuals can experience ambivalence and perceive two contradictory feeling states at 
one time; borderlines characteristically shift back and forth, entirely unaware of one 
emotional state while immersed in another. (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 14)  
Another BPD related symptom affecting interpersonal relationships, is the fear of 
abandonment. As clinicians point out, such a fear may push an individual with BPD to 
take the frantic measures in order to avoid being abandoned. Person may begin pushing 
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away her loved ones to test how deep the loyalty runs. She may sabotage the closest 
relationships and leave the loved ones first out of the fear of abandonment. One more 
feature linked to the condition is explosive attacks of anger over the trivial matters, 
making interpersonal communications highly difficult.  
 
2.2.2. Impulsivity and Self-Harm  
Impulsive and self-destructive behavior is another hallmark of borderline personality 
disorder. As characterized, people with BPD repeatedly engage in self-damaging 
behavior without considering possible outcomes. Most commonly, these actions involve 
reckless driving, uncontrollable eating, gambling and spending, substance abuse and 
sexual promiscuity. As reported by the clinicians, substance abuse and eating disorders 
are highly common among the people having BPD.  
Numerous studies have linked BPD with anorexia, bulimia, ADHD, drug addiction, and 
teenage suicide—all of which have increased alarmingly over the last decade. Some 
studies have uncovered BPD in almost 50 percent of all patients admitted to a facility for 
an eating disorder. Other studies have found that over 50 percent of substance abusers 
also fulfill criteria for BPD. (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 8)  
Patients with borderline personality disorder are described as people having a very hard 
time controlling their impulses. Once the particular impulse hits, it is felt as an immediate 
need, which has to be met. As psychologists explain, impulsive and risky behavior serves 
as a coping mechanism with the chronic pain and turbulence of emotions they experience 
and an attempt to fill the chronic emptiness. “After they engage in an impulsive act, they 
usually report feeling momentarily better. However, those feelings of satisfaction are 
quickly replaced by enormous guilt, anxiety, and self-loathing” (Elliot, Smith 2009: 68).  
More extreme of self-damaging behavior related to the condition is self-harm, a very 
common trait among those diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. The self-harm 
behavior ranges from cutting, scratching and burning skin to hair pulling and head 
banging. These actions usually do not aim suicide and are used for different reasons by 
those qualified as borderlines. One of the most common reasons of hurting own body 
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pointed out by clinicians is an attempt to distract self from emotional pain. Some of the 
patients with BPD describe their internal pain unbearable to the extent that they need to 
reduce overwhelming emotional discomfort by virtue of causing the physical pain. 
Another common reason named is to fight emotional numbness, trying to ‘feel 
something’. Some report using self-harm as a punishment act, believing they deserve the 
pain.  
As many as 75 percent of borderlines have a history of self- mutilation, and the vast 
majority of those have made at least one suicide attempt. [...] For these borderlines, the 
body becomes a road map highlighted with a lifetime tour of self-inflicted scars. Razors, 
scissors, fingernails, and lit cigarettes are some of the more common instruments used; 
excessive use of drugs, alcohol, or food can also inflict the damage. Often, self-mutilation 
begins as an impulsive, self-punishing action, but over time it may become a studied, 
ritualistic procedure. (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 46)  
Furthermore, suicidal behavior is a fundamental concern in BPD. Patients with borderline 
personality disorder are identified as the major risk group for suicide. As clinicians state, 
risk of the suicide remains being high throughout the life cycle, while many of other BPD 
symptoms tend to decrease and settle down over time.  
As many as 70 percent of BPD patients attempt suicide, and the rate of completed suicide 
approaches 10 percent, almost a thousand times the rate seen in the general population. In 
the high-risk group of adolescents and young adults (ages fifteen to twenty- nine), BPD 
was diagnosed in a third of suicide cases. […] Although many of the defining criteria for 
BPD diminish over time, the risk of suicide persists throughout the life cycle.29 
Borderlines with a childhood history of sexual abuse are ten times more likely to attempt 
suicide. (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 35; 46)  
 
2.2.3. Identity Disturbance  
Another central feature of borderline personality disorder is lacking a core sense of 
identity. Clinicians report that most of the patients with BPD are not capable to draw a 
clear picture of who they are, but tend to bear very vague and oftentimes contradictory 
understanding of self. Following, people with BPD frequently adapt different roles and 
rapidly transform based on the situations and environments. Instability and unclearness of 
self-concept results in frequent changes of physical appearance, preferred values, circles 
of friends, long-term education and career goals.  
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As follows, chronic feeling of emptiness is linked with the identity-disturbance among 
the patients with BPD, which in its turn is linked with impulsive and self-destructive 
behavior.  
Many people with BPD report feeling painfully empty inside. They have cravings for 
something more, but they can’t identify what that something more is. They feel bored, 
lonely, and unfulfilled. They may attempt to fill their needs with superficial sex, drugs, or 
food, but nothing ever seems truly satisfying — they feel like they’re trying to fill a black 
hole. (Elliot, Smith 2009: 30)  
Furthermore, among the symptoms of BPD are listed paranoid ideation and brief quasi- 
psychotic moments. That is, at times an individual with BPD may be convinced that they 
are in a serious danger and someone is after them, as well as experience being out of 
touch with the reality and self, . As explained, such experiences of paranoia, dissociation 
and depersonalization are brought on by the stressful situations. While dissociating, 
perceptions of a patient may get severely distorted, involving all of the five senses. 
Clinicians distinguish psychotic and paranoid episodes of patients with BPD from those 
experienced by individuals with psychotic illnesses, outlining that former tends to be 
brief and transient, usually disappearing after the stressful situation is passed.  
The borderline may become transiently psychotic when confronted with stressful 
situations (such as feeling abandoned) or placed in very unstructured surroundings. [...] 
Unlike patients with psychotic illnesses, such as schizophrenia mania, psychotic 
depression, or organic/ drug illnesses, borderline psychosis is usually of shorter duration 
and perceived as more acutely frightening to the patient and extremely different from his 
ordinary experience. And yet, to the outside world, the presentation of psychosis in BPD 
may be indistinguishable, in the acute form, from the psychotic experiences of these other 
illnesses. The main difference is duration: within hours or days the breaks with reality 
may disappear, as the borderline recalibrates to usual functioning, unlike other forms of 
psychosis. (Kreisman, Straus 2012: 52-53) 
Delving into the clinician description of borderline personality disorder features, it can be 
said that regardless heterogeneity, symptoms seem to be interconnected and in some 
sense make a logical chain. Like a domino effect, extreme intensity and instability of 
emotions cause extreme behavioral responses, manifested by impulsive and self-
damaging actions. Having no clear self-concept leads to the chronic feeling of emptiness 
as well as dissociative symptoms. However, some may argue that most of these 
symptoms can be found in other mental disorders and putting them together can be in a 
sense forced action to form BPD as a separate, valid diagnosis. Despite this criticism, this 
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relatively new diagnosis seems to draw the huge attention of the researchers, reinforcing 
its status as a severe mental illness on its own.  
 
2.3. On the Etiology of Borderline Personality 
Disorder  
2.3.1. Genetic and Biological Explanations  
The question of what causes borderline personality disorder is the subject of massive 
discussion among the researchers, with no clear answer. Recent studies suggest that there 
is no single reason for developing borderline personality disorder, but the condition 
evolves due to the interaction of different elements. Clinical theorists believe that BPD is 
a result of mixture of environmental, biological and genetic factors. That is, genes 
determine the level of sensitivity towards the environment, while in their turn 
environmental events influence the brain functioning and development of personality. 
“BPD represents the end product of this interplay between biological vulnerabilities and 
environmental influences. As such, we think of it as a highly individualized disorder“ 
(Hooley, Cole, Gironde 2012: 415).  
Several research results indicates that first-degree relatives of borderline patients are ten 
times more likely to show signs of the disorder than the general public. However, this 
alone cannot prove the genetic basis of BPD, as family members mostly share the same 
living environment and have similar childhoods. Following, one may assume that this is 
environmental factors what raises risk of BPD in such families, not necessarily genetics. 
The argument is somewhat rebuffed by evidence from the study of identical twins 
(International archives of medicine, vol. 8. No.56), obviously sharing the same genetic 
construction, but being adopted into different families. The results indicated that in most 
cases BPD is predicted by genetic factors. “Torgersen and colleagues finding of a 68% 
heritability abruptly invalidated the many theories about borderline personality disorder’s 
etiology that had focused exclusively on environmental causes. It established borderline 
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personality disorder’s credentials as a “brain disease” (Gunderson 2009: 534). However, 
as explained, it does not mean in a strict sense that BPD, the ready product as such is 
inheritable disorder.  
Rather what are inherited are genes that confer susceptibility to traits that are important 
features of BPD such as neuroticism or impulsivity. Traits like these are also 
diagnostically nonspecific. In other words, they may predispose the person to a range of 
psychiatric problems. This helps explain why rates of comorbidity are so high in those 
with BPD. (Hooley, Cole, Gironde 2012: 416-417)  
Following, number of neurobiological studies conducted, have suggested that brains of 
individuals with BPD show some structural differences relatively to those having no 
diagnosis of BPD. For instance, several results of studies have proved that parts of the 
brain that puts break on emotions as well as are responsible on the impulsivity level are 
much less active in borderline patients than in healthy people. It is important however, 
not to overemphasis an importance of these results specifically for the BPD study, since 
most of the data has been compared to mentally healthy people. While comparing results 
of brain functioning of patients with BPD with brain functioning of other clinical 
patients, differences occurred were not that significant.  
For example, Brunner and colleagues (2010) reported reduced DLPFC and OFC volumes 
in BPD patients compared to healthy controls. However, there were no significant 
differences in the volumes of these brain areas when the BPD patients were compared to 
clinical controls. Some of the other structural abnormalities observed in BPD patients 
have also been observed in other disorder. (Hooley, Cole, Gironde 2012: 422)  
 
2.3.2. The Role of Environmental Factors  
Developmental theories on the causes of BPD focus on the environmental factors and life 
events affecting the personality development. A theory that traumatic events of childhood 
and unhealthy attitude of the parents towards their children dramatically increase the risk 
of developing BPD is widely supported by the mental health professionals.  
When compared to the healthy controls, the early lives of those with BPD featured 
significantly more parental discord, more parental absences (e.g., mother in the hospital; 
father in the jail), more physical violence in the family, more experiences of being raised 
by other relatives or in a foster home, and more sexual abuse during childhood. (Hooley, 
Cole, Gironde 2012: 419)  
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Clinicians report that most of the patients with BPD come from the dysfunctional 
families, have a childhood abuse history, involving both physical and sexual abuse. These 
findings explain the high prevalence post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among the 
people diagnosed with borderline personality disorder.  
A history of childhood abuse is highly prevalent in adult patients with borderline 
personality disorder (BPD). In clinical settings, 40% to 76% of adults with BPD report 
childhood abuse: 25% to 73% report childhood physical abuse (Zanarini, 2000). […] 
Documented sexual abuse is associated with elevated BPD symptom levels among young 
adults seen in community surveys (Johnson, Cohen, Brown, Smailes, & Bernstein. 1999) 
[…] To some investigators, these associations suggest an etiology role for childhood 
abuse in the development of borderline psychopathology […]. (Soloff, Lynch, Kelly 
2002: 201-202)  
Marsha Linehan further clarifies how the unhealthy environment can affect someone’s 
personality development to the course of BPD. She outlines that in such instances a 
person usually either leaves the invalidating environment, or tries to meet the 
expectations of this environment via changing own behavior. “The borderline dilemma 
arises when the individual cannot leave the environment and is unsuccessful at changing 
either the environment or her own behavior to meet the environment’s demand” 
(Linehan, 1993: 52).  
Overall, clinicians and researchers agree that both clinically and etiologically 
heterogeneous condition named as BPD seems to be a collisional result of complex life 
events and genetic vulnerabilities. An interesting aspect to note here is that BPD is 
mostly diagnosed in women. This gave a rise to the stereotype that it is a women’s 
illness. 
In the last decade, the literature on the relationship between gender and borderline 
personality disorder (BPD) has generated much controversy and little clarity. Recently, 
BPD has been characterized as the “bad girl” of psychiatric labels (Backer, 2000), a 
charge that was based on the presumption of an increase in the application of the 
borderline diagnosis to women and the existence of a sex bias in the clinical diagnosis of 
BPD (Zlotnick, Rothschild, Zimmerman 2002: 277)  
Clinicians claim that BPD affects both genders equally and the only reason of 
aforementioned tendency is that men seek treatment less often than women and thus most 
of them remain under-diagnosed. Another critical explanation goes across the topic of 
socially imposed judgments on the gender roles. It is reasonable to assume, that the 
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clinicians may be initially driven by the gender stereotypes and evaluate one and the 
same traits differently, based on the sex of a patient. For instance, sexual promiscuity can 
be seen as a borderline personality disorder trait in case of woman, but may be considered 
as relatively normal behavior in case of a male patient. In the same manner, inappropriate 
anger exhibited by woman can be qualified as a BPD symptom, but deemed as more of 
the antisocial trait, or even a criminal behavior in case of men. This assumption suggests 
that mental health professionals mostly do not apply BPD to man, even if they exhibit 
same traits as women getting the diagnosis of BPD. The theoretical probability of the 
latter assumption to be true, serves as a reminder of how conditional the essence of a 
mental disorder label can be in terms of socially implied judgments.  
 
2.4. Stigma of a borderline  
2.4.1. Mystery of BPD  
As a matter of fact, there is a huge stigma attached to the condition known as borderline 
personality disorder, as a result of which people labeled with it are often referred as 
manipulative, attention seeking and frantic. Stigma goes so far, that patients with BPD 
frequently get rejected from therapists, as too difficult to treat.  
Ask the man on the street about anxiety, depression, or alcoholism, and he would 
probably be able to provide a sketchy, if not technically accurate, description of the 
illness. Ask him to define Borderline Personality Disorder, and he would probably give 
you a blank stare. Ask an experienced mental health clinician about the disorder, on the 
other hand, and you will get a much different response. She will sigh deeply and exclaim 
that of all the psychiatric patients, borderlines are the most difficult, the most dreaded, 
and the most to be avoided – more than schizophrenics, more than alcoholic, more than 
any other patient. (Kreisman, Straus 2010: 5)  
The description of people with BPD offered by the clinician psychologist and a mystery 
writer Jonathan Kellerman in 1989 is a visible example of imposing dramatic meanings 
to the condition and to those qualified as borderlines. He christened patients with BPD as 
"a therapist’s nightmare" as they "never really get better" and stated that, the best 
therapist can do is to “help them coast, without getting sucked into their pathology”.  
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They are the chronically depressed, the determinedly addictive, the compulsively 
divorced, living from one emotional disaster to the next. Bed hoppers, stomach pumpers, 
freeway jumpers, and sad-eyed bench-sitters with arms stitched up like footballs and 
psych wounds that can never be sutured. Their egos are as fragile as spun sugar, their 
psyches irretrievably fragmented, like a jigsaw puzzle with crucial pieces missing. They 
play roles with alacrity, excel at being anyone but themselves, crave intimacy but repel it 
when they find it. Some of them gravitate toward stage or screen; others do their acting in 
more subtle ways.. Borderlines go from therapist to therapist, hoping to find a magic 
bullet for the crushing feelings of emptiness. They turn to chemical bullets, gobble 
tranquilizers and antidepressants, alcohol and cocaine. Embrace gurus and heaven-
hucksters, any charismatic creep promising a quick fix of the pain. And they end up 
taking temporary vacations in psychiatric wards and prison cells, emerge looking good, 
raising everyone’s hopes. Until the next letdown, real or imagined, the next excursion 
into self-damage. What they don’t do is change. (Kellerman 1989: 113-114)  
In his poetically mysterious narrative Kellerman in essence portrayed the picture of 
someone inherently sick without any hope to get better. Apparently, reading such lines 
would only strengthen feeling of despair and hopelessness in someone having the 
diagnosis of BPD, as well as would scare away the therapist determined to help her. The 
preceding paragraph can be seen as an example of the tendency of mystification and 
stigmatizing the diagnosis. Along such an approach condition ceases being just a 
diagnosis with its characteristics, but acquires additional meanings. It can be said, that 
mental illnesses in their nature are already implied to be understood as in some sense 
mysterious, but borderline personality disorder due to the complexity and turmoil it 
offers, appeared in the best position to be an object of dramatic mystification.  
In her work Illness as Metaphor Susan Sontag analyses the society’s tendency to 
approach illnesses metaphorically, giving them symbolic meanings and in so doing 
mystifying them, often times leading to negative outcomes for the patents. Her objects of 
analysis are cancer and tuberculosis. However, speaking of the tendency of approaching 
illnesses symbolically, it is very much possible to draw parallels between the cancer and 
borderline personality disorder.  
As long as a particular disease is treated as an evil, invincible predator, not just a disease, 
most people with cancer will indeed be demoralized by learning what disease they have. 
The solution is hardly to stop telling cancer patients the truth, but to rectify the 
conception of the disease, to de-mythicize it. (Sontag 1977: 7)  
Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate regarding the name of the diagnosis, suggesting 
that the term ‘borderline’ is not only imprecise, but also very stigmatizing, since it has 
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been used as a negative adjective, referring to too difficult and troubled patients. There 
have been various alternative name suggestions proposed, such as emotionally unstable 
personality disorder (as it is refereed in ICD-10), impulsive personality disorder, 
emotionally impulsive personality disorder, etc. However, the proponents argue, that such 
alternatives pose different kind of drawbacks, as they are too specific, focused only one 
aspect of the disorder, such as intensity or impulsivity tarits and ignoring the whole set of 
other major symptoms.  
Linehan suggests that the stigma of BPD should be fought on the different basis, rather 
than replacing the label, which she thinks cannot solve the problem. She makes a very 
valuable point, indicating how the abnormal behavior can be understood as normal in a 
specific context.  
Although I am no fun of the term “borderline”, I do not believe that we will reduce 
prejudice against these difficult-to-treat individuals by changing labels. Instead, I believe 
that the solution has to be the development of a theory that is based on sound scientific 
principles, highlighting the basis of the disordered “borderline” behaviors in “normal” 
responses to dysfunctional biological, psychological, and environmental events. It is by 
making these individuals different in principle from ourselves that we demean them. And 
perhaps, at times, we demean them to make them different. Once we see, however, that 
the principles of behavior influencing normal behavior (including our own) are the same 
principles influencing borderline behavior, we will more easily empathize and respond 
compassionately to the difficulties they present us with. (Linehan 1993: 26)  
 
2.4.2. ‘Bunny Boilers’ - BPD and the Fictional World  
As far as impact of media goes, there is not much legitimate information about BPD in 
popular culture, which can be one way to explain the low awareness of BPD in the 
general public. However there are few illustrations of BPD presented in the fiction. We 
can have a look at two widely popular movies associated with borderline personality 
disorder: Girl Interrupted and Fatal Attraction. None seem to help the situation. Rather, 
one simply does not clarify anything, whilst another greatly encourages stigma.  
In Girl Interrupted, the main hero Susanna Kasen ends up in the mental hospital after her 
suicide attempt and gets diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. “Borderline 
between what and what?” – wonders Susanna hearing of the term for the first time. Her 
	 51	
psychiatrist does not seem to know much about the condition either. The movie takes 
place in the late 1960s, which in reality was the time when the diagnosis still did not have 
its valid meaning. Consequently, film does not contribute much in illustrating a clear 
picture of the condition. Fatal Attraction, on the other hand, portrays an unforgettably 
terrifying character of Alex Forrest, who after spending a night and falling in love with 
the married man, Dan Gallagher, refuses to let him to continue his life without her. She 
does numerous frantic things, cuts her wrists in a suicide attempt, spies on him, makes 
phone calls and even shows up at his apartment, blackmails him that she will tell his wife, 
pours acid on his car, kidnaps her little daughter. She goes as far as murdering and 
boiling a pet rabbit of the family, leaving it on the stove of their kitchen. As a final 
consequence, she ends up being killed after appearing in the bathroom of Dan’s wife, 
being in a completely delusional state, attempting to murder her with a kitchen knife.  
Despite the fact, that the BPD diagnosis has never been mentioned in the movie plot, 
some of the psychiatrists diagnosed the character with borderline personality disorder and 
declared her to be a very good illustration of woman with BPD. Since then, Alex Forrest 
has been widely associated with a ‘borderline woman’. There are various papers and 
articles spread over the internet, indicating on the similarities between Forest and an 
individual with BPD. Moreover, the borderline personality disorder section in the sixth 
edition of Abnormal Psychology (1994: 267) is accompanied by the picture of Alex 
Forest as an example of BPD case. The caption of the portrait clarifies that she “had 
many characteristics of the borderline personality”(Further editions of the book have 
removed the stigmatizing example). Bringing forth such a disturbing example linking the 
dreadful image with the mental condition is the fastest way to stigmatize the diagnosis 
and people obtaining it. No wonder, someone whose understanding of the condition is 
linked to character of Alex Forrest, perceives people with BPD as scary and crazy that 
must be avoided by all means.  
While one may say, that according to the present diagnostic criteria, character of Alex has 
some borderline traits, such as fear of abandonment and suicide gestures, evidently, her 
behavior goes far beyond that. Important aspect to mention here is that given the variety 
of symptomology and numerous possibilities of distinguishing between different 
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combinations of symptoms listed in nine criteria of DSM, the disorder may present itself 
very differently from person to person based on what combination of symptoms one 
exhibits. In this respect, it seems unreasonable to speak of the pure or classical type of a 
borderline patient at all.  
The BPD construct is polythetic in nature and no one specific symptom is regarded as 
necessary. This means that there are 126 different ways that the five out of nine required 
symptoms can be combined. It is therefore not surprising that, from a clinical perspective, 
BPD is such a heterogeneous disorder. (Hooley, Cole, Gironde 2012: 410)  
Moreover, as clinicians state, BPD rarely stands alone and there is high co-occurrence 
with other disorders, what makes the picture even more variable. With this in mind, 
drawing the fixed portrait of someone with BPD, applicable to all cases sounds even 
more preposterous.  
It can be concluded from the above analysis that practice of overgeneralizing associations 
is utterly irrelevant when it comes to the disorder representing such a mosaic of 
diagnostic criteria as BPD. It can be also said, that diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder is indeed the fine example of a condition the label of which is greatly 
empowered with the mystical and dramatic meanings attached to it.  
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3. Cultural Semiotics Discourse and 
Analytical Interviews  
In the following chapter, the discussion around the mental disorder diagnosis is 
conceptualized in the framework of cultural semiotics. The paper puts forward the claim 
that receiving the diagnosis of borderline personality disorder is followed with the 
significant semiotic processes taking place in the consciousness of a labeled person. The 
primary aim of the following study is to cast the light on such supplementary processes, 
presenting BPD as an operative label entering a perceptive semiotic relationship with a 
person.  
The first section of the chapter provides theoretical discourse divided into three blocks, 
briefly overviewing cultural semiotic theories, having a direct bearing on above-
mentioned processes. The first subchapter deals with the notion of self-description and 
discusses the role it plays in the process of accepting and internalizing the diagnostic 
label. In the following block the discussion centers on the communication modeling 
systems, considering possible obstacles occurring in interpersonal communication for 
those diagnosed with mental disorder. The final subchapter overviews the notion of 
autocommunication and considers its appearance in the process of perceiving oneself 
through the prism of personality disorder label.  
For the sake of providing a thorough analysis, theories discussed in the first part of the 
paper are particularized via case studies in the next section. Results of the online 
interviews that have been conducted with eleven individuals diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder are carefully examined and interpreted in the light of cultural 
semiotics theories. The main questions asked were oriented towards three primary 
directions: the initial responses on the event of getting the BPD diagnosis; the tendency 
of establishing boundaries and obstacles encountered in the process of interaction with 
others; and a person’s subjective reasoning in terms of experiencing oneself through the 
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prism of attributed diagnostic label. Accordingly, the empirical analysis is divided into 
three parts featuring these different aspects of the BPD label functioning. The first 
subchapter looks over the patient’s initial responses towards the event of getting 
diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. The aim of this subchapter is to 
demonstrate the role and contextual relevance of person’s self-description in regards with 
forming a connection with the BPD label. In the following subchapter, the issue under 
scrutiny is interpersonal communication and difficulties individuals diagnosed with BPD 
report to encounter while interacting with the people having no knowledge of their 
diagnosis, as well as with those having BPD. And the final part of the analysis studies the 
reflective processes linked to the self-addressing, where the notion of autocommunication 
offers important points of focus for the analysis.  
 
3.1. Cultural Semiotics Discourse  
3.1.1. Self-Description  
By and large, human beings, as the self-aware creatures are capable of composing their 
own self-concept. Although, evaluating of self by the individual can sometimes be 
qualified as maladaptive from the third parties, it does not abolish its genuineness as a 
subjective idea about oneself. However, not getting a corresponding feedback from the 
outside world may affect steadiness of one’s self-image, especially in instances of having 
a specific need of getting approval and validation from others. It can be even said that at 
some extent, self- image of every person is a product of outside influences. For instance, 
massively accepted standards of beauty may greatly affect one’s idea of own physical 
worth, in many cases leading to lowering or heightening general self-esteem. In short, 
every person capable of thinking and reflecting does construct one’s own self-image, 
whether solid or loose.  
In terms of semiotics of culture (Lotman 1990: 128) self-description serves as a 
regulating mechanism against too much diversity within the semiosphere, threatening to 
	 55	
cause the loss of its systemic wholeness. Here Lotman refers to self-description as the 
highest form and final act of a structural organization. However, he outlines that although 
the system going through the stage of self-description reaches the greater structural 
organization, it loses inner reserves of indeterminacy “which provide it with flexibility, 
heightened capacity for information and the potential for dynamic development”.  
Applying aforementioned notion to the individuals diagnosed with a mental disorder, it 
must be taken into account, that a person gets introduced with already existing 
typological description of the diagnosis and evaluates whether it corresponds or not to 
their concept of self. In the former instance, the individual places oneself in the general 
category and in so doing, at some extent limits self to the determined structure. The 
question of which is the chicken and which is the egg may arise here, concerned with the 
issue of whether a self-concept plainly matches with a diagnostic description, or the latter 
shapes the former.  
Speaking of categorical descriptions, with no intention to draw the parallels between 
astrology and psychiatry, the example of twelve zodiac signs can be brought. To leave 
aside the context and the degree of validness, astrology differentiates twelve personality 
types in accordance of zodiac signs, attributing exclusive traits to each signs. Many claim 
to recognize themselves among the features accounted to the particular zodiac sign. Yet, 
not everyone familiar with the astrological classification of signs identifies oneself with 
her zodiac sign, qualifying the characterization of possessed sign as irrelevant to their 
personality. This mere example may suggest that self-analysis must be the starting point 
and underlying factor to form the synthesis with the description offered. However, 
Lotman clarifies that the gap between forming a self-concept and processes bringing it 
into being is not so clear-cut.  
The system, passing through the stage of self-description, undergoes changes: assigning 
to itself clear boundaries and a considerably higher degree of unification. However, 
separation of the process of self-description from the state preceding it is possible only in 
a theoretical sense. In reality both levels continuously influence each other. (Lotman 
2009: 172)  
On these grounds, going back to the chicken-egg problem, it can be said that self-
descriptive process is a dynamic movement carrying a reciprocal relationship with the 
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concepts it merges with. Accordingly, self-concept of a psychiatrically diagnosed person 
is much likely to acquire position of influencing the concept in a sense of internalizing it, 
as well as getting influenced with the integration formed. Furthermore, speaking of 
dynamics of culture, Lotman develops the claim that there is a mutual tension between 
culture’s internal structure and external influences.  
Thus, an “external” culture in order to enter into our world must cease to be “external” to 
it. It must find for itself a name and a place in the language of the culture into which it 
seeks to insert itself. But in order to change from “alien” (chuzhoi) to “own” (svoi) this 
external culture must, as we can see, submit to a new name in the language of the 
“internal” culture. The process of renaming does not take place without leaving a trace of 
that content which has received the new name. (Lotman 2009: 133)  
Conceptualizing the theory of culture dynamics on the individual level, it seems possible 
to draw parallels between the abovementioned collision and internalization of a mental 
disorder label. Corresponding to person’s self-concept, the label covering a diagnostic 
criteria ceases being external and becomes owned, giving rise to the division of world 
into ‘us’ and ‘them’ in its turn.  
 
3.1.2. Communication Modeling Systems  
Lotman sets off two possible scenarios concerning communication between the addresser 
and the addressee. In one instance “the mechanism of communication is inherently given, 
but the content of communication is theoretically absent; in the other situation, the 
content of communication is inherently given, but the mechanism of communication is 
theoretically absent.” (Lotman 1977: 96) Lotman clarifies bringing the example of two 
humans not capable of using regular sign language in the communication, but signaling 
each other via their involuntary psychological or physiological symptoms. Supposing 
both individuals share the common code set allowing each to access and process signals 
coming from another, it can be said that a fundamental mechanism for semiotic 
communication is present, but a content for exchange is absent, as both parties transfer 
identical meanings. Following, Lotman suggests that the meaningful and functional 
semiotic communication is achievable by means of finding the balance between those 
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two systems. “At the basis of every act of exchange lies the contradictory formula, 
“equivalent but different”: the first part of the formula makes an exchange technically 
possible and the second part makes it meaning full in content.” (1977: 96)  
On these grounds, we can put forward the issue of communication between individuals 
diagnosed with the same mental disorder, exhibiting the same set of symptoms and their 
interpersonal communication with mentally healthy people. As those diagnosed with 
BPD or any other mental disorder share the initial set of codes concerning the features of 
their diagnosis, they are capable to decipher the messages sent in the direction of each 
other. However, the content exchanged in such cases is mostly similar and less likely 
provides valuably new information for the participants of a dialogue. That is, is not "full 
in content". Rather, standing on the mutual understanding of familiar feelings, fulfills an 
empathic function, providing support and understanding. On the other hand, interaction 
with people, not connected to the diagnosis and not having the basic knowledge of it, 
may create difficulties for both sides, as one may feel misunderstood and not heard, while 
another may find oneself being confused and lost. Although in terms of exchanging the 
content such a conversation would be fruitful, the lack of commonly shared codes would 
affect the level of intelligibility and mutual translatability of the information.  
The communication based on a specific type of information, such as the psychiatric 
knowledge of a personality disorder, is likely to be understood by only a small number of 
people. Thus, it may create difficulties in a whole series of cases, resulting in incomplete 
semiotic communication. The message transmitted, which is difficult to decipher gets 
interpreted by the recipient of information on his own terms, often times qualified as 
misinterpretation by the addresser.  
The more complex the structure of a message, the more individual is its interpretation by 
each recipient of the information. The act of exchanging information ceases to be a 
passive transfer of a message that is adequate onto itself from one bloc of memory to 
another and becomes a translation, in the course of which the message is transformed and 
the striving for adequacy enters into dramatic conflict with the impossibility of its 
complete realization. The act of communication begins to include the aspect of tension 
within itself. (Lotman 1977: 97-98)  
Furthermore, along the lines of individual texts oriented towards addresser and addressee, 
authors of Tartu-Moscow Semiotic School distinguish between the cultures oriented 
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towards the hearer and the speaker.  
An example of a culture oriented toward the hearer would be one in which the axiological 
hierarchy of texts is arranged in such a way that the concepts “most valuable” and “most 
intelligible” coincide. [...] A culture oriented toward the speaker possesses as its highest 
value the sphere of closed, inaccessible, or completely unintelligible texts. It is a culture 
of the esoteric type. [...] The orientation of the culture toward the “speaker” (addressor) 
or the “hearer” (addressee) will be revealed in the fact that in the first case the audience 
models itself according to the pattern of the creator of the texts (the reader seeks to 
approach the poet’s ideal); in the second case, the sender constructs himself according to 
the pattern of the audience (the poet seeks to approach the reader’s ideal). (Lotman, 
Ivanov, Pjatigorskij,Toporov,Uspenskij 2013: 60)  
In this respect, it can be suggested that the information on the mental disorder transmitted 
by the individuals diagnosed with one, by its semiotic nature is oriented towards the 
speaker. In regards of unintelligibility of a text, the picture may somewhat change with an 
attempt of addresser to simplify the message, by means of avoiding the use of specific 
diagnostic language for instance. However, it perhaps does not change the orientation of 
communication altogether, as the addresser stays in the position to provide the 
information about oneself, which requires specific knowledge to be comprehended by the 
recipient.  
 
3.1.3. Autocommunication  
Usually, while we speak of the communication we tend to picture the plain scheme of 
participants exchanging the information between one another. In short, any activity 
whereas the information is mutually transmitted, processed and reflected can be qualified 
as what Lotman calls a communication with ‘I-S/he’ direction. As suggested, this type of 
communication renders the message that has been unknown to the recipient before the 
conversation took the place. While pointing out a prevalence of the aforementioned 
orientation, Lotman gives introduction to the ‘I-I’ direction of the communication. ‘I-I’ 
direction takes place when a person addresses oneself, conveying already known 
information. Autocommunication does not aim for remembering something that would 
make it more similar to ‘I-She’ direction.  
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When we speak of communicating a message by the ‘I-I’ system we are not thinking 
primarily of those cases where the text fulfills a mnemonic function. When that happens 
he perceiving, second, ‘I’ is functionally equivalent to a third party. The difference comes 
down to the fact that while in the ‘I-s/he’ system information is transferred in space, in 
the ‘I-I’ system it is transferred in time” (Lotman 1990: 21)  
Following, the essential purpose of autocommunication derived from the ‘I-I’ direction, 
is reflecting on already existing information, rather than providing the new ones. In this 
respect, autocommunication is concerned with the reception of code and providing the 
reflective response on this code. In other words, autocommunication serves as a 
contemplating mechanism for one’s state of mind, resulting in creation of new meanings 
and refashioning of self.  
In the ‘I-I’ system the bearer of the information remains the same but the message is 
reformulated and acquires new meaning during the communication process. [...] The ‘I-
s/he’ system allows one merely to transmit a constant quantity of information, whereas 
the ‘I-I’ system qualitatively transforms the information, and this leads to a restructuring 
of the actual ‘I’ itself. In the first system the addresser transmits a message to another 
person, the addressee, but remains the same in the course of the act. In the second system, 
while communicating with him/herself, the addresser inwardly reconstructs his/her 
essence, since the essence of a personality may be thought of as an individual set of 
socially significant codes, and this set changes during the act of communication. (Lotman 
1990: 22)  
The definition cited above makes obvious the important place autocommunication holds 
in analysis of person’s relationship with her label, which in case of the following study is 
borderline personality disorder. Getting the latter diagnosis and familiarizing oneself with 
its essence, a person gets engaged in the communication whereas she is both the 
addresser and addressee, reflecting on the acquired information on BPD and drawing new 
meanings about oneself.  
In the process of this autocommunication the actual person is reformed and this process is 
connected with a very wide range of cultural functions, ranging from the sense of 
individual existence which in some types of culture is essential, to self-discovery and 
auto- psychotherapy. (Lotman 1990: 29)  
Following, seeing their self in a new light, a person may take the diagnosis as a superior 
component of the personality, leading to the tendency of perceiving oneself through the 
lenses of acquired label. Such a fusion with the mental disorder label may create 
difficulties with the intrapersonal functioning and rational judgement, blurring the lines 
between the personality traits and diagnostic features. On the other hand, practicing 
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reflective thinking may fulfill the function of increasing one’s awareness, resulting in 
sharpening the boundaries between the self and label instead.  
 
3.2. The Analysis of Interviews  
3.2.1. A Relief or a Death Sentence? – Initial Responses  
While it can be assumed that getting diagnosed with the illness occurs as a negative event 
in one’s life, the event may contain beneficial aspects to the person. As the results 
obtained from the interviews demonstrate, the response to getting borderline personality 
disorder label contains the significant relieving aspects. As a matter of fact, nine out of 
the eleven interviewed persons state that finding out they had BPD was to some degree a 
relieving experience. Some of the extracts from the interviews, demonstrating a foregoing 
tendency are cited below.  
-It was a relief for me because we finally put a name to something we had been puzzled 
about for several years. (Daniel C.H.) 
-I would say I felt relief. I felt this way because it let me know that yeah, I am different 
but at least I know why now. (Taylor O.)  
-There was a mixture. First there was relief because I now knew what was happening had 
a name and could be identified. (Charles R.P.)  
- I felt good and comfortable with it. I felt that finally there was a reason why I was why I 
am. I wasn’t just a crazy bitch. (Ashley H.) 
-It was a relief. It made sense of the way I had been feeling. It wasn’t my fault, all the 
things I had felt, thought and done. (Helen L.) 
-It was both fear and relief. I was relieved because I finally had a name for the monster 
following me around. (Jade T.)  
-I felt relieved to know I wasn't "crazy". I was scared and happy.... it's hard to pin point 
my feelings. But I was for sure relieved to be able to put a label on it. (Samantha T.)  
-I was scared but at the same time I was relieved. Relieved in the way that I finally knew 
what was wrong with me. (Emilisse R.M.) 
As may be seen above, finding the name for the condition, that is putting the label on 
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one’s cognitive and behavioral pattern, may serve as the clarifying mechanism, 
determining obscure and undefined elements of personality. Looking back to the example 
of astrological classification of signs, pointed out in 3.1.1, it becomes apparent that in 
regards to mental illnesses, categorical descriptions of personality types are and have to 
be far more bound and determined. Certainly, astrological classifications, which mainly 
have acquired entertaining function, are universal, as every single person can be labeled 
with one.  
Considering their specific context, diagnostic manuals of mental disorders, on the other 
hand, are not normally inquired without the presence of undesirable symptoms that can 
also serve as the intensifier of the need to match a self-concept with a classification, 
which may seem as a promising mechanism to get the answers on the abundant questions. 
Accordingly, regardless the negative context getting diagnosed with mental illness bears, 
it may have a soothing effect on the person, struggling to figure out oneself.  
The notion of self-description discussed in the previous section becomes of importance 
here, as it can be said that the diagnosis fulfills the function of regulating instrument for 
person’s self-concept. The data gathered does not imply, that a person has no concept of 
self until gaining the BPD label and it creates one in a strict sense. Rather, the point 
indicates that the unsettled elements of self-description become organized and in a sense 
justified after putting a diagnostic label on them. Remembering the process of receiving 
borderline personality disorder diagnosis, Ashley H. mentions that she has never heard of 
BPD before, but immediately recognized it as her diagnosis as she got familiar with its 
essence.  
I first learned of my diagnosis when I woke up on my second day, or third, in the 
hospital. The nurse had brought in paperwork of what the doctor diagnosed me with. I 
read the papers and immediately felt panicky. Later that morning I saw the counselor and 
we talked and he broke BPD down for me and I had a "that's totally me" moment.  
In fact, most of the interviewees claim that learning about borderline personality disorder, 
they instantly acknowledged and accepted it as the right diagnosis. Some report having 
the information about BPD long before getting diagnosed. Thus, for them, getting the 
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official diagnosis was only a confirmation of what they have accepted in advance. 
Brittany R. D. notes that she suspected having BPD six years before getting the actual 
diagnosis.  
I believed I had it when I realized I didn't feel any emotions to an acceptable degree. I 
was either overly sensitive to it, or felt nothing at all. I lived with it and dealt with it on 
my own until a year ago when the panic attacks started. I was struggling just to get out of 
bed in the morning. I cried nightly because I felt like everyone, including family, hated 
me. I thought people were only nice to me because they wanted to find reason to laugh at 
me behind my back. I had a constant battle with my mind.  
Along similar lines, Rebecka C., previously misdiagnosed with clinical depression and 
bipolar disorder, states that she was aware of having BPD, but it took more time for 
mental health specialists to recognize it too. “I never felt like depression or bipolar 
disorder fit completely, so it was almost a sense of "this is where I belong." Recalling her 
high school age, Taylor O. also affirms recognizing BPD as her disorder long before 
being labeled with it.  
It all started when I was 13 and just kept getting worse until I just recently got help.. I 
knew I was different after 3 suicide attempts and self harm.I remember in a high school 
psychology class we were learning about BPD and I thought wow, that sounds exactly 
like me, but I was too ashamed to get help.  
The cases noted above illustrate the initial dynamics of self-descriptive system, orienting 
itself towards reasoning. Finding the right structure corresponding to its nature, concept 
of self gets fused with it, simultaneously absorbing it and getting absorbed by it. To 
clarify, it can be said that the label serves as a tool giving form to undefined states of 
mind in in so doing justifies, legitimates and in a sense even normalizes them. The 
responses cited below can serve as an excellent example of such a tendency.  
-After I found out, it was like obtaining missing puzzle pieces to a puzzle I didn't know I 
was working on. Every thing just made sense. (Samantha T.)  
-I finally understood why I always felt like an outsider, a stranger to happiness. And for 
the first time ever.. It felt like I was born. That I knew who I finally was and that I had to 
deal with her now or never. (Emilisse R.M.)  
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3.2.2. ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ – Difficulties with Communication  
Speaking of proper names, Lotman points out (2009: 31) that the use of them is 
inherently linked with the isolation of individual personality. Although, linguistically 
speaking mental disorder labels are common nouns, not the proper names, the specific 
signification carried make them perceivable as such.  
No less significant are the various taboos placed on proper names; on the other hand, the 
placing of taboos on common nouns (for example, the names of animals, sicknesses, etc.) 
definitely indicates in a whole series of cases that the corresponding designations are 
perceived (and, accordingly, function in the mythological model of the world) precisely 
as proper names. (Lotman, Uspensky 1978: 214)  
Following, a mental disorder label may function as a proper name and encourage the 
practice of embedding the boundaries between individuals with psychological 
vulnerabilities and mentally healthy people. The initial theoretical foundation for the 
construction of a dividing wall lies in the sense of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Individuals, aware of their diagnosis, hence having more structured concept of self, are 
able to point finger on the major differences between them and those regarded as 
mentally healthy people. Experiencing emotions more intensely is the most commonly 
identified distinctive feature named by the research participants.  
My world is just more intense. Everything is felt ten fold. I've had some extremely 
traumatic things happen in my life, like most with BPD, and I've had people say to me 
that anyone who experienced that would not be the same when all is said and done. What 
they don't realize is that I was broken long before those things happened, so where a 
normal person would have been shaken, I was absolutely devastated. I have flashbacks to 
those times out of nowhere. I remember what it smelled like, what I saw, what I heard... 
It’s just way more intense. (Rebecka C.)  
As may be seen above, Rebecka C, understanding self in relation to the other, clearly 
differentiates between her and ‘a normal person’ and stresses the major difference 
coming down to the level of emotional vulnerability. She also mentions facing a lot of 
difficulties on a daily basis “that most people could not imagine dealing with for even an 
hour”. Similarly, other respondents indicate on their extreme emotional reactions and not 
being able to balance their feelings.  
-My emotions are times 10. I can't just be sad, I have to be breaking down crying. I can't 
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be upset I'm so pissed off I want to kill someone. My emotions are my worst trait. 
(Ashley H.)  
-I feel emotions either so powerfully that that they send me into a panic or they are not 
there at all and I can come off as cold and uncaring when I'm actually very caring. 
(Brittany R.D.)  
Charles R.P. for the most part identifies himself with the rest of the society, however 
recognizes the differences too. “I would say, philosophically I can’t say I am not them. 
However, I know in a logical sense that healthier people live a much less chaotic life”. 
Representing a gender minority of people diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, 
he further reports experiencing the additional difficulty to identify self with "the mostly 
female world of BPD". The latter line of though depicts the presence of boundaries, 
operating even within the world of one diagnostic entity. Despite of sharing the same 
label, a person assuming a role of minority may feel detached from the group. Evidently, 
the need of being properly understood in order to establish a working connection with the 
outer world is a fundamental human need. Jessica R.M. qualifies the world of people with 
BPD as more difficult, “because we are less understood”. To be understood, at first one 
needs to get engaged in a communicative activity. Yet, establishment of such 
communicative activities seems to be a challenging mission for those labeled with 
borderline personality disorder.  
As it was discussed in the previous section, providing the complete semiotic 
communication is greatly dependent on the right balance between two aspects – 
technicality and meaningfulness. The difficulties encountered in the communication 
pointed out by the interviewees display the lack of the balance mentioned above. Nearly 
every person interviewed finds it challenging to communicate with people having no 
proper knowledge of borderline personality disorder. The primary obstacles outlined are 
elements of stigmatization coming through the addressee and their own difficulty to 
explain different manifestations of the disorder understandably for those they are 
communicating with.  
-I find it very challenging to explain to people who do not understand the disorder. 
(Jessica R.M.) 
-I feel it is very hard to talk about this illness with someone who doesn't have it. (Taylor 
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O.)  
- I don't really have any experience communicating with other BPD people but I imagine 
I would be more mindful of what I say and how someone might react. It is not uncommon 
for me to read something 5 or 6 times when messaging anyone at all, in case I may upset 
them or seem a bit blunt about things. (Daniel C.H.) 
-I find it particularly difficult to share because I often end up feeling invalidated when 
talking about it. I've heard from many people, "oh, I get like that too," "it's probably just 
PMS," "well, just be more positive and you'll feel better," and just this past Christmas my 
sister and best friend said, "I just don't have time to deal with you being depressing." And 
when you get comments like that from people who love you, it's extremely intimidating 
to put it out to strangers. Few people have ever heard of BPD, let alone know what it 
actually is. And the few that think they do know what it is only think so because they saw 
it on TV. So, odds are that their perception is not correct.(Rebecka C.) 
 
-The biggest difficulty is the lack of understanding from people that don't have any 
knowledge of BPD. My boyfriend's signature line is "I don't understand" and I always say 
exactly you don't, and you never will. People who care about us try to understand but 
they will never fully be able to. (Ashley H.)  
The last assertion from the above list demonstrates how immense the wall built between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ can be. In such instances, the communication with anyone but member of 
‘us’ is already predestined for a failure, as the addresser deems the addressee incapable to 
fully comprehend the content transmitted to his direction. The content for the meaningful 
exchange is present, but the mechanism enabling the convenient decipherment seems to 
be missing. On the logical grounds, one of the hindering factors for the transmission of 
intelligible text can be the use of metalanguage, as most of the mental illnesses BPD also 
presents its symptom specific terminology, widely adapted by mental health specialists as 
well as their patients. However, according to the results of individual interviews, the 
employment of BPD-specific language is not what gets in the way, since such a tendency 
is mostly absent among those interviewed. Moreover, respondents report that they try to 
simplify the information they share about their disorder, to reduce chances of further 
confusion.  
-I try not to use terms that will confuse people further. I try to describe it metaphorically 
so people can relate to what I feel. (Brittany R.D.)  
-I never use those types of words. I feel like people don't understand it. Sometimes even I 
don't understand it. (Taylor O.)  
-Even when I'm talking to a doctor or therapist, I don't use terms like that. (Ashley H.)  
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The person affirming to use the specific diagnostic vocabulary explains it as her attempt 
to make her friends more familiar with the disorder.  
-I want them to know and learn what BPD is and what it consists of. Just this morning, I 
was sitting in the University yard in a 15min class break and after I had muffin, I started 
to cry about the dang muffin and my friend had to console me cause I had felt bad that I 
had eaten the muffin but I still wanted more. At that moment she learned what Binge 
Eating is and I explained how it can also be associated with my BPD, myself image and 
stress levels. (Emilisse R.M.)  
As the findings suggest, individuals with borderline personality disorder are likely to feel 
either misunderstood or not understood at all while expressing themselves to mentally 
healthy people. As the addresser and the addressee do not share the common code, do not 
speak the same language so to say, the message transmitted requires the translation in the 
mind of recipient to be comprehended. This very act of encoding the information tends to 
be unsuccessful, at least from the point of view of addresser, resulting in the failure of the 
communication on the whole.  
With this in mind, one may presume that a communication whereas both parties are 
diagnosed with the same disorder must be successful and semiotically complete, as both 
the transmitter and the receiver of message would share the common code, enabling each 
to properly comprehend the information. However, as discussed in the previous section, 
in such  
instances the problem would not be eliminated, but replaced with different type of 
difficulty. That is, although technically the information would be successfully transmitted 
through both directions, the content for exchange would be missing. Moreover, Lotman 
states (1974: 303) that the use of one and the same code by the collective, results in 
composing of semiotically uniform individuals, losing their individuality.  
While some of the participants state to feel much more comfortable while communicating 
with other people having borderline personality disorder, the reason of which is that “they 
know the struggle of it”, others specify the difficulties they encounter having a 
conversation with someone sharing the diagnostic label with them.  
- Having two BPDs together I feel like there will be a lot of hurt feelings but they will 
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understand where you are coming from. On the other hand speaking with someone who 
has no idea what it is like just thinks you are too sensitive or too emotional. So I feel like 
it can be rough either way. 
-Actually I find it difficult to talk with others with my same experiences. It seems to turn 
into a "my horse is bigger than your horse" discussion. (Brittany R.D.)  
-Talking to other people with BPD is helpful because they get it. They get the moods that 
come on for no reason. But at the same time, a lot of the time it seems like it's almost a 
‘who has it worse’ competition. (Ashley H.)  
The sentiments expressed in these examples can be boiled down to the problem of 
sharing the single code and ‘speaking the same language’, which at first glance may seem 
to be nothing else but a guarantee for the establishment of a flawless communicative 
channel. Regardless of the fact that both participants are able to make perfect sense of 
what another person has to say, a conversation is disposed to create the circle of 
circulating the same information over and over again. Given that participators of such 
interaction are engaged in the equivalent exchange of identical messages that provides no 
novel information for them, it may take the form of competition, with an attempt to make 
own information qualitatively different from another’s.  
 
3.3.3. ‘Because I have BPD’ - Reflecting on the diagnosis  
A person who internalizes her diagnostic label is likely to begin perceiving self through 
the lenses of the diagnosis. Naturally, the convergence of a person and a label may 
stipulate the tendency of seeing oneself in a total new light. The whole majority of 
individuals interviewed declare that they fully accept BPD diagnosis as an inherent part 
of them. “I would like to say that I am not my illness, but to a point I am. And if someone 
can't handle my illness, they can't handle me”(Rebecka C.).Yet, some have developed 
slightly different understanding of the concept, interpreting the diagnosis as their 
irrational side, which at times takes over their rational side and this is when it becomes 
the big part of them. “I guess you could say that I do perceive it as separate until it takes 
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me over” (Brittany R.D.). 
Following, a label’s manifestation of itself as a core element of one’s personality, may 
lead to the experiencing a confusion regarding the shift between a personality and the 
diagnosis manifesting itself in the certain situations. Depending to the degree of fusion 
experienced by the individual, a line between normal behavior and disordered conduct 
may get quite blurred  
-I constantly have to ask people if my reactions are justified or if I am letting BPD take 
over. It is always blurry like what I should feel and what I am feeling. (Taylor O.)  
-Sometimes I wonder how I would react if I didn't have BPD. (Jessica R.M.)  
-I have always been a very sensitive person, so when the intense emotions hit, it's hard to 
tell if it's me or my illness. (Rebecka C.)  
Furthermore, the tendency of justifying thoughts and behavior in terms of the diagnosis is 
present. Talking about her emotional responses towards both positive and negative 
instances, Helen L. qualifies herself as more responsive to the environment, than most of 
the people. She brings an example of taking a walk at night, making her feel happy for no 
reason and connects it to her diagnosis.  
I stare at the trees for instance, it makes me feel happy and I think it is because of my 
disorder, because I do not see or hear other people doing the same. When the situation is 
bad though, I feel so terrible, sometimes way worse than I should and what should be a 
normal response. I'm irrational.  
Following, comparing herself with other people, Emilisse R.M. expresses the similar 
sentiment.  
I can see this calmness in others people lives that I don’t think I’ll ever have. Because as 
someone with BPD, I find myself fighting with my own thoughts, emotions and I tend to 
repress certain types of ways to express them. I don’t think normal people go through 
this.  
As illustrated, speaking of their emotional experiences both individuals refer to their 
diagnosis, as the explanation of states of mind qualified as abnormal. The label here 
provides some degree of authority within which experiences deviating from the standard 
norm acquire their legit value. That is, even something 'abnormal' may get normalized in 
its context, being covered by the diagnostic label.  
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I justify my emotions when I get very angry at times. I was happy to read about that 
symptom from DSM, it was not in ICD. I had felt ashamed for being so angry before. 
Now I know why I get that way and it makes it easier to control. (Helen L.)  
There is an evident relationship between the tendencies discussed and the notion of 
autocommunication overviewed in the subchapter 3.1.3. Clearly, the contemplated 
thoughts presented above are derived from ‘I-I’ type of communication. A person draws 
conclusions in regards of her relationship with the diagnosis, which given the vagueness 
of the subject, at times leads to the natural confusion, creating further questions. 
Following, a person begins addressing oneself, transmitting already known information 
from ‘I’ to ‘I’ and reflecting on it as a result of which information that stays the same 
acquires a new supplementary meaning. The primary tool of reflection is the fact of 
having BPD, as this is what explains and justifies atypical organization of personality. In 
this respect, it can be said that information of having BPD serves as a code following the 
messages addressed to oneself. Lotman very clearly explains the difference between the 
functions of the message and the code in the process of autocommunciation.  
Fundamentally speaking, a text is used as code and not message when it does not add to 
the information we already have, but when it transforms the self-understanding of the 
person who has engendered the text and when it transfers already existing messages into 
a new system of meanings. If reader N receives the message that a certain woman called 
Anna Karenina has as a result of an unhappy love affair thrown herself under a train, and 
if that reader instead of adding this information to what she already has in her memory, 
comes to the conclusion: ‘Anna Karenina is me’ and starts changing her understanding of 
herself, her relationships with people and perhaps even her behavior, then obviously she 
is using the novel not as a message like any other, but as a kind of code in her own 
process of self-communication.” (Lotman 1990: 30)  
Apparently, there is a good match between the example of ‘Anna Karenina is me’ 
brought into light by Lotman and ‘BPD is me’ mental outlook within which self-analysis 
take place. However, in case of diagnostic manuals, as discussed earlier, it should not be 
understood strictly as the copying a behavior, but as internalizing it, once recognized as 
'own model of behavior'. Speaking of ‘I-I’ communication, Lotman also brought the 
example (1990: 21) a person writing the diary jottings, with the main purpose to elucidate 
the writer’s inner state. Further corresponding examples of such self-analytical 
ruminating operations are brought by the interviewed individuals, talking about the train 
of thought they tend to contemplate, while searching for the possible triggers of their 
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behavior.  
-Every strong feeling or thought I have is analyzed and processed as a witness not as a 
fact. In this way, I can balance my feelings/reactions better and have a better-balanced 
life. (Charles R.P.)  
-It depends on the situation but I mostly tend to look through the day, search for the 
possible trigger that could have started my little domino effect. (Emilisse R.M.)  
Apart from the confusion and justification individuals labeled with BPD seem to engage 
in autocommunication for the therapeutic purposes as well. Some of the interviewees 
revealed an interesting tendency of speaking about themselves in a much more positive 
manner while considering their diagnosis, that is using the code ‘I have BPD’ than 
without it. When asked how would they describe themselves if they had never heard of 
borderline personality disorder, some of the respondents used very negative and self-
stigmatazing adjectives. However, when asked to take into account their diagnosis, they 
revealed much more self- tolerance. For instance, “inhuman” and “out of control” was 
changed with “understanding”. The way Ashley H. refers to herself overlooking her 
diagnosis and then taking it into account is a very fine example of the label’s capacity to 
generate new meanings about oneself.  
-I was just an angry, emotional bitch. That's how I always described myself, and how 
people described me. No one ever enjoyed being around me. I was just a shitty person. 
 - Well, I think I'm still an emotional basketcase sometimes but I know now more or less 
that I have to take a breath before I say or do anything. I've gotten my anger issues under 
control a lot more too. So, I'm a calmer person I think now that I'm aware of my 
diagnosis. 
 
Furthermore, the response of Daniel C.H. “A good guy at heart but struggling with 
something that I have little to no control over”- is another visible example of the 
autocommunicative reflection. The individual recognizes his problems, addresses them to 
self and reflecting upon them through the code ‘I have BPD’ concludes to be a good 
person, who has a little control over the way things are with him. That is, the information 
about having the problems does not change, but acquires a new meaning.  
One more outcome of self-addressing in those with BPD seems be the ability to analyze 
the pleasant side of their diagnosis. Some of the individuals reveal a tendency to connect 
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not only undesirable, but also their positive features to the borderline personality 
disorder.  
Despite all of the negatives, there are some positives that I get from it, like immense 
creativity, empathy sometimes to a fault, passion for everything I do, and a huge heart 
with so much love to give to others. I really relate to the quote "It is both a blessing and a 
curse to feel so intensely. (Rebecka C.)  
As it can be seen from the analysis, the diagnostic label of BPD certainly serves as a 
meaning-generator unit, entering into the specific relationship with a person obtaining it. 
Besides the internal ‘mysterious’ nature of it as a mental illness diagnosis, the additional 
meanings attached to it and the level of its complexity makes this relationship process 
semiotically more sophisticated.  
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Conclusion		
The thesis presented a comprehensive account of the relationship, taking place between a 
label of a mental illness diagnosis and a person obtaining it. The descriptive analysis of 
the general topic of mental health, its history and the thorough overview of the study 
object itself made the paper interdisciplinary approachable.  
 
The theoretical discourse regarding the dilemma concerning the validity of mental 
illnesses showed the possibility of expanding the horizon and comprehending the subject 
matter more extensively. It demonstrated that the very notions of the abnormality and 
illness can be boiled down to the problem of subjectivity. Thus, making the radical 
statements on the essence of such concepts proves itself as an unreasonable practice.  
 
Given its position to study the meaning-making processes, in large part semiotics can 
serve as a way to broaden the perspectives of comprehending the full picture of the 
various problematic topics.  
 
In the present work, the valuable theories of cultural semiotics proved themselves helpful 
in analyzing such an intriguing and by its nature complicated interconnection as a 
relationship of a person and a mental illness diagnosis. The notions of self-description, 
communication modeling systems and autocommunication have been of a great use in the 
process of exploring the terrains of diagnostic world of BPD and the operative nature of 
its label.  
 
Empirical part of the analysis has acquired the major significance for the better 
understanding of the aspects discussed theoretically. Insights and visions offered by the 
individuals directly connected to the study object is a valuable addition to the theoretical 
discourse presented in the thesis. Cultural semiotic approach to the manifestation of the 
BPD diagnosis expands the horizon and broadens perspective of comprehending the 
nature of mental disorder label.  
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Based on the general results, it is possible to conclude that the research into mental health 
related problems, such as stigma, public unawareness, problem of subjectivity and 
individual perceptions and the supplementary processes of getting the diagnosis can be 
relevant to the field of semiotics. Moreover, it can be said that semiotic accounts on the 
aforementioned topic can greatly contribute to the better understanding of the issues and 
providing the alterative ways of approaching the problems of mental health.  
Further research is required in regards the role of gender in the clinical world of BPD and 
other mental disorder. Several questions on the topic remain to be addressed, requiring 
more research. The study of the issue would be of interest for the people from different 
disciplines, given the theoretical premises of the subject. Certainly, the topic positions 
itself as a promising topic for another semiotic analysis, as concentrating on this aspect 
may unfold an interesting cryptic linked with the social implications in regards of gender 
roles, possibly affecting such cases as getting the mental illness diagnosis.  
 
To the author’s best knowledge there is no semiotic paper written on the relationship 
between a mental illness label and it bearer specifically. On these terms, the work 
introduced a novel subject matter for the research, with the hope to draw a significant 
attention to the topic of mental health and its relevance for the science of semiotics.  
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Appendix 1 
The Interview Questions  1.	When	did	 you	 get	 diagnosed	with	borderline	personality	 disorder	 and	what	preceded	it?	 2.	What	made	you	think	(if	so)	that	you	might	have	some	mental	illness?		3.	Was	 getting	 BPD	 diagnosis	 the	 first	 time	 you	 heard	 of	 this	 disorder	 or	 you	already	had	some	information	about	it?		4.	What	was	your	first	reaction/emotion	when	you	heard	of	your	diagnosis?	Was	it	scary?	Unpleasant?	Or	did	you	feel	some	kind	of	relief?	Please	specify	why?	5.	Are	you	comfortable	with	telling	people	that			you	have	borderline	personality	disorder?	Why?	Why	not?		6.	Do	you	experience	any	elements	of	stigma	when	you	tell	people	(if	so)	about	your	diagnosis?		7.Do	you	find	it	easier	to	communicate	with	people	with	BPD	or	at	least	familiar	with	the	disorder?	And	what	are	the	main	difficulties	you	encounter	(if	so)	while	communicating	with	people	having	no	knowledge	of	BPD?		8.Do	you	usually	use	BPD	specific	language,	while	talking	about	your	emotional	experiences	 (Splitting,	dissociating,	 etc)?	Do	you	 find	 it	 challenging	 to	describe	these	feelings	to	someone	not	familiar	with	the	disorder	and	its	characteristics?		9.	Out	of	all	the	BPD	symptoms	and	traits	what	are	the	most	difficult	for	you	to	deal	with?		10.How	often	do	you	explain/justify	your	behavior	or	emotions/perceptions	 in	terms	of	BPD	(To	yourself)?		Can	you	give	some	examples?		11.How	would	 you	 say	 your	 world	 as	 someone	with	 BPD	 differs	 from	 other’s	world?		12.Do	 you	 sometimes	 experience	 confusion	 whether	 your	 reactions/emotions	are	‘normal’	and	‘justified’	or	it	is	BPD	taking	over?	Can	you	give	some	examples?	13.	 	 How	 much	 of	 you	 is	 BPD?	 Meaning,	 do	 you	 perceive	 your	 diagnosis	 as	something	separated	from	your	identity,	or	do	you	experience	sort	of	fusion	and	take	it	as	a	part	of	you?	14.	 How	 would	 you	 describe	 your	 personality	 if	 you	 had	 never	 heard	 of	borderline	personality	disorder?	
15.How	would	you	describe	yourself	considering	your	diagnosis?			
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary in Estonian 
Magistritöö „Semiootiline vaatepunkt Piirialast Tüüpi Isiksusehäirele“ uurib selle  
diagnoosiga määratletud isikute nii enessesse kui ka nimetusse suhestumist. Töö on 
jaotatud kolme suuremasse ossa ning hõlmab nii teoreetilist kui ka empiirilist 
analüüsi. 
 Esimene osa keskendub vaimuhaiguse määratlemisega seotud probleemidele. 
Keskseks vastanduseks on vaimuhaiguse mõistmine ühest küljest temas eneses, 
objektiivselt ja essentsiaalselt ning teisest küljest isiku subjektiivse kogemuse toel. 
Siinkohal osutub suhestumine diagnoosiga esmatähtsaks. 
 Püüeldes interdistsiplinaarsuse poole, esitab töö nii ajaloolise kui ka 
deskriptiivse ülevaate Piiripealset Tüüpi Isiksusehäirest. Järelduste tegemisel on 
arvesse võetud mõlemat, ajaloolist tausta ja kaasaegset psühhiaatrilist teadmist. 
 Töö viimane osa lisab metoodilisse lähenemisse kultuurisemiootika ning uurib 
piirpealse häirega isikutega sooritatud intervjuusid. Peatükk analüüsib piiripealse 
häire nimetuse (diagnoosi) ja isiku semiootilist suhestumist. 
 Arvestades analüüsi tulemusi, soovib autor rõhutada semiootilise lähenemise 
tähtsust vaimse tervise probleemidele lähenemisel. 
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